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Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original
Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause
by NICHOLAS M. MCLEAN*
Introduction
For much of this nation's history, the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment' received little attention from courts or
scholars.2 Over the past two decades, however, Excessive Fines
Clause jurisprudence has experienced a significant revival. Most
* The author wishes to extend special thanks to Akhil Amar for invaluable
conversations and insights on a number of topics relating to this project. For very helpful
comments on earlier drafts, sincere thanks are also due to John Bessler, Stephen Bright,
Abbe Gluck, and Kate Stith, as well as to the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.") (emphasis added).
2. The 1978 edition of Corwin's classic treatise, for example, states simply that
"[tihe Supreme Court has had little to say with reference to excessive fines or bail."
EDWARD SAMUEL CORWIN, HAROLD WILLIAM CHASE & CRAIG R. DUCAT, THE
CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 432 (1978). In the words of one author,
"the Excessive Fines Clause was virtually a dead letter." Barry L. Johnson, Purging the
Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause and Desert-Based
Constitutional Limits on Forfeiture After United States v. Bajakajian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
461, 468 (2000); see also Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the
Excessive Fines Clause, 76 N.C. L. REV. 407 (1998) (suggesting that "the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, has ... gone virtually without judicial comment for
most of the two hundred years since the adoption of the Bill of Rights"); Robert Brett
Dunham, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Excessive Fines Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1617, 1617 (1989) ("The controversial and emotionally charged nature of the
death penalty has focused eighth amendment debate on the 'cruel and unusual
punishments clause.' In contrast, the 'excessive fines' clause has been moribund.");
Richard M. Re, Can Congress Overturn Kennedy v. Louisiana?, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1031, 1041 (2010) (describing the Excessive Fines Clause as "often overlooked");
Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses of
History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 836 (1997) ("Given that much of the Bill of Rights is subject
to immense judicial gloss through precedent, it is remarkable that the Excessive Fines
Clause had for decades remained a virtually overlooked provision."). As late as 1988, a
leading periodical would describe the Excessive Fines Clause as merely "a blank slate"
and "an obscure phrase in the Eighth Amendment." Lawsuits: Punish and Suffer,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 1988, at 31, 36.
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notably, in the 1998 case of United States v. Bajakajian, the Supreme
Court for the first time held that a forfeiture constituted a
constitutionally "excessive" fine.4
In the years since Bajakajian, lower courts have (in the absence
of further guidance from the Supreme Court) grappled with a variety
of issues associated with Excessive Fines Clause doctrine. Against
this backdrop has emerged a little-noticed but important circuit split
regarding the appropriate test for determining the constitutional
"excessiveness" of a fine or forfeiture. Most courts have read the
Supreme Court's opinion in Bajakajian as requiring a tightly cabined
analysis: as long as a penalty is not grossly disproportionate in
relation to its associated offense, it is not barred by the Eighth
Amendment! These courts have generally not regarded a
3. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
4. Although the Bajakajian case is today the leading case on the Excessive Fines
Clause, the 1990s renaissance in the Supreme Court's Excessive Fines Clause
jurisprudence began several years earlier. In the 1993 case of Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602 (1993), the Supreme Court affirmed that the Excessive Fines Clause applies in
the context of in rem civil forfeitures; however, the court "decline[d] th[e] invitation" to
delineate the appropriate test for determining constitutional excessiveness at that time.
Id. at 604, 622-23; see generally Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767,
803 n.2 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting the Excessive Fines Clause was "rescued
from obscurity" in Austin). It is noteworthy, however, that the significant revival in
Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence in the courts over the past two decades has been
unmatched by a commensurate increase in the level of scholarly attention. One author's
suggestion that it is "almost as if the everyday nature of the fine ... has discouraged the
interests of academics" is, perhaps, instructive. S. Shaw, Monetary Penalties and
Imprisonment: The Realistic Alternatives, in PAYING FOR CRIME 29 (P. Carleen & D.
Cook eds., 1989); cf. Pat O'Malley, Theorizing Fines, 11 PUNISHMENT & SoC'Y 67, 68
(2009) ("[T]he fine is virtually ignored theoretically, as though too obvious or too trivial to
require such analysis.").
5. Courts have recognized that the proportionality analysis associated with the
Excessive Fines Clause is necessarily fact-intensive and not amenable to inflexible, bright-
line rules. See, e.g., United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 819, 824 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that the
proportionality inquiry "requires a fact-specific evaluation"). Nevertheless, in developing
tests for "gross disproportionality," most state courts and federal circuit courts have hewn
fairly close to the factors set out by the Court in Bajakajian, described by one court as the
following: "[1] the essence of the crime of the defendant and its relation to other criminal
activity, [2] whether the defendant fit[s] into the class of persons for whom the statute was
principally designed, [3] the maximum sentence and fine that could have been imposed,
and [4] the nature of the harm caused by the defendant's conduct." United States v.
Castello, 611 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Varrone, 554 F.3d 327,
331 (2d Cir. 2009)); see also, e.g., United States v. Mackby, 339 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir.
2003) ("We have ... looked to factors similar to those used by the Court in Bajakajian in
our Excessive Fines Clause cases.").
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defendant's inability to pay a fine as a relevant consideration in the
context of the Eighth Amendment.'
The First Circuit,' however, has required courts to consider an
additional factor as well-would the contemplated fine or forfeiture
be so severe as to destroy a defendant's livelihood? This addition of a
second stage to the constitutional excessiveness inquiry represents a
notable departure from the approach taken by the majority of
modern courts. Nevertheless, it is an approach that is significantly
more faithful to the history and purpose of the Excessive Fines
Clause. In contrast, the majority view-that Bajakajian requires
courts to disregard a defendant's ability to pay a fine for the purposes
of the Excessive Fines Clause analysis-arguably misreads Bajakajian
and, I suggest, renders a construction of the Excessive Fines Clause
that is both inequitable and ahistorical.
The First Circuit's emerging Excessive Fines Clause
jurisprudence goes some way toward resurrecting a foundational, but
today, largely forgotten principle of English law known as salvo
contenemento suo (translated as "saving his contenement," or
livelihood). Enshrined in the Magna Carta, this principle had become
firmly established as a fundamental principle at common law by the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The principle required, among
other things, that a defendant not be fined an amount that exceeded
his ability to pay. The historical evidence suggests that the English
Bill of Rights' outlawing of "excessive fines" was intended-at least
in part-to reaffirm this principle. In this Article, I trace the
development of the principle of salvo contenemento, focusing in
particular on the role this background norm played in informing early
understandings of prohibitions against excessive fines in England, in
the American colonial period, at the time of the Founding, and in the
early Republic.'
6. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 656 F.3d 821, 828-29 (8th Cir. 2011); United
States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[E]xcessiveness is
determined in relation to the characteristics of the offense, not in relation to the
characteristics of the offender.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
7. This line of cases begins with United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir.
2007), and was developed further in United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 83-85 (1st Cir.
2008).
8. This work can thus be seen, at least in part, as an "extended historical
concurrence," Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the
Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 863, 868 (2006), to this emerging strand of
First Circuit doctrine; my aim is to defend the basic intuition behind this line of cases,
while simultaneously sketching the possible contours of such a doctrine.
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As a historical matter, the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment can appropriately be understood as encoding two
complementary, but distinct, constitutional principles: (1) a
proportionality principle, linking the penalty to the offense, and (2)
an additional limiting principle linking the penalty imposed to the
offender's economic status and circumstances. We might call this
second principle the Eighth Amendment's "economic survival" (or
perhaps "livelihood-protection") norm. And yet-in sharp contrast
to the large academic literature that has developed on the issue of
proportionality9-scholarly exploration of this further core meaning
of the Eighth Amendment remains notable largely for its absence.
While the Supreme Court has occasionally alluded to the notion that
the original English excessive fines clause might have contemplated
9. For a small slice of recent scholarly discussions of the concept of proportionality
in the punitive or Eighth Amendment context, see JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL &
UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS' EIGHTH
AMENDMENT (2012); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
(2009); William W. Berry III, Promulgating Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69 (2011);
John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific Critique of
Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71 (2010); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and
Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2004); Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences,
Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89
MINN. L. REV. 571 (2005); Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing:
The Supreme Court's Tortured Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J.
107 (1996); James Headley, Proportionality Between Crimes, Offenses, and Punishments,
17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 247 (2004); Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional
Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1995); Adam J.
Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Donna
H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
527 (2008); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA.
L. REV. 677 (2005); Evan J. Mandery, In Defense of Specific Proportionality Review, 65
ALB. L. REV. 883 (2002); Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective
on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41 (2000); Wayne A.
Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681 (1998); Susan Raeker-Jordan, Kennedy, Kennedy, and the
Eighth Amendment: "Still in Search of A Unifying Principle"?, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 107
(2011); Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement
Litigation Benefit from Proportionality Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53 (2009); Alice
Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263 (2005);
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355
(1995); John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011); William W. Taylor, III, The Problem of
Proportionality in RICO Forfeitures, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 885 (1990); Stacy J.
Pollock, Note, Proportionality in Civil Forfeiture: Toward A Remedial Solution, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 456 (1994); Douglas S. Reinhart, Note, Applying the Eighth Amendment to
Civil Forfeiture After Austin v. United States: Excessiveness and Proportionality, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 235 (1994).
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ability to pay as a core referent of "excessiveness," 0 no scholarly
work has sought to apply these historical insights to the emergent
Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence that has developed in the lower
courts in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1990s rehabilitation of the
Clause." This is a surprising and unfortunate gap in the literature
because a modern Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence that reflected
the history and original meaning of the Clause would be more
equitable, more sensitive to the plight of the indigent, and more
conducive to the rehabilitative goals of the criminal law.
I seek to address this gap in the literature by articulating and
systematically developing an account of the Eighth Amendment's
economic survival norm. I proceed in seven parts. In Part I, I
provide a brief overview of the Excessive Fines Clause and the
modern case law interpreting the Clause. I focus primarily on the
Supreme Court's leading Excessive Fines Clause case, United States v.
Bajakajian, and the jurisprudence that has developed in the lower
courts in the wake of that case. In Part II, I introduce the traditional
English legal principle of salvo contenemento and examine the role
this principle played in informing the meaning of the excessive fines
10. See, e.g., S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2362 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 354-55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Browning-Ferris
Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 267 (1989). This history is also
discussed in Lois G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689 91 (1981) and in
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372-73 (Univ. of Chi. Press ed. 1979).
11. To the extent that modern scholarly works have considered the possibility that an
offender's individual economic circumstances might be relevant for the purposes of the
Excessive Fines Clause inquiry at all, these discussions have been relatively summary
treatments that have been proffered in the context of discussions focused on applications
other than criminal fines and forfeitures. See Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination
Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 122-23 (2004) (discussing this
history in the context of a discussion largely focused on the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of
Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 155-56 (1986) (presenting this history in the
context of a discussion of potential constitution limitations on civil punitive damages);
Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from
History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1274 (1987) (same). The question addressed by two of
the above articles-whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to punitive damages in
private civil litigation-was resolved in 1989, when the Supreme Court held in Browning-
Ferris, 492 U.S. at 257, that it did not. For an important further discussion of the Excessive
Fines Clause in the context of a critique of the Court's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause jurisprudence, see Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Harmelin's Faulty Originalism
16-17, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2127660 (unpublished manuscript, 2012). Mannheimer
criticizes Justice Scalia's suggestion in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), that the
inclusion of the word "excessive" in the Excessive Fines Clause, coupled with that word's
exclusion from the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, should be read as a rejection
of a proportionality principle in the case of the latter clause. See id. at 978 n.9 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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protections of the 1689 English Bill of Rights. In Part III, I consider
American colonial understandings of the concept of salvo
contenemento as fundamental law and undertake a brief survey of
post-Founding understandings of the meaning of the phrase
"excessive fines." In Part IV, I consider the public meaning of the
Excessive Fines Clause at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification in order to explore how we might conceptualize the
meaning of this provision as applied against the states. In Part V, I
examine the modern case for fully reintegrating the economic survival
norm of salvo contenemento into Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
In Part VI, I examine certain doctrinal implications of my thesis. Part
VII concludes.
I. The Excessive Fines Clause
The Eighth Amendment's command that "excessive fines" not
be "imposed"" is far from self-defining." Although the terms "fine"
and "excessive" both had established meanings in the Founding era,"
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
13. See BESSLER, supra note 9, at 193-94 (noting that "on its face, the text says
neither how large fines or bail amounts can be before they become 'excessive"'.);
Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 1063 (stating that "a prohibition of 'excessive fines'
inherently requires some way of deciding what is too much" but "the textual argument
does not provide much of an answer"); see generally Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958) (noting that "the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise") (footnote
omitted); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 871 (1960)
(characterizing the Eighth Amendment as one of the Constitution's "less precise
provisions").
14. The landmark 1828 edition of Webster's dictionary defines "fine" as "[a] sum of
money paid to the king or state by way of penalty for an offense; a mulct; a pecuniary
punishment." 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828) (unpaginated); see also, e.g., 1 T. SHERIDAN, A GENERAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 3 (1780) (defining "fine" as "[a] mulct, a
pecuniary punishment; penalty; forfeit, money paid for any exemption or liberty").
Webster's dictionary provides two different definitions for the word "excessive." The first
defines it as "[b]eyond any given degree, measure or limit, or beyond the common
measure or proportion; as the excessive bulk of a man; excessive labor; excessive wages."
WEBSTER, supra. The second definition is "[b]eyond the established laws of morality and
religion, or beyond the bounds of justice, fitness, propriety, expedience or utility; as
excessive indulgence of any kind." Id. In Bajakajian, the Supreme Court simply stated
that Webster's 1828 dictionary defines "excessive" as "beyond the common measure or
proportion." 524 U.S. at 335. The Court's decision to ignore the second definition
provided, and instead to quote only half of the first definition, is a somewhat surprising
one-particularly because the example Webster provides in support of the second (much
broader) definition of "excessive" is the following: "Excessive bail shall not be required."
WEBSTER, supra; see generally Stinneford, supra note 9, at 914-26 (undertaking a close
textual reading of the Eighth Amendment).
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the text of the Clause would nevertheless seem to leave many
questions unanswered. For example, the Clause itself lacks a
referent: a fine must not be "excessive," but "excessive" in relation to
what, exactly?" The direct legislative history of the Eighth
Amendment is also far from dispositive as to the meaning of the text.
The adoption of the Eighth Amendment generated scant debate in
the First Congress and the state ratifying conventions;" then, as now,
what debate there was tended to focus on the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, rather than the Excessive Fines or Excessive
Bail Clauses." However, in contrast to the admittedly limited
guidance offered by the plain meaning of the text of the Excessive
Fines Clause, the broader historical context of the provision is both
extensive and instructive.
The language of the Eighth Amendment was based on an
analogous provision in the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776,"
which in turn echoed a provision of the English Bill of Rights of
1689.19 This document was itself declaratory of traditional rights
embodied in case law and in a number of statutes and other
documents, including the Magna Carta of 1215.20 The content of
15. This issue is discussed in Claus, supra note 11.
16. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (noting that the Eighth
Amendment "received very little debate in Congress"); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 840-42
(1969) (discussing the debates on the Eighth Amendment in the state ratifying
conventions).
17. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
18. See Va. Declaration of Rights § 9 (1776), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 234-235 (1971). On the influence of
the Virginia Declaration of Rights, see, e.g., BESSLER, supra note 9, at 177-93; JEFF
BROADWATER, GEORGE MASON, FORGOTTEN FOUNDER (2006); and ROBERT ALLEN
RUTLAND, GEORGE MASON: RELUCTANT STATESMAN 65-67 (1989).
19. See ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE
REVOLUTION, 1775-1789 146 (1924).
20. Magna Charta, 9 Hen. III, ch. 14 (1225), 1 STAT. AT LARGE 6-7 (1762 ed.); see
also NEVINS, supra note 19, at 146 ("In the main, [the Virginia Declaration of Rights] was
a restatement of English principles-the principles of Magna Charta, the Petition of
Rights, the Commonwealth Parliament, and the Revolution of 1688."). In light of its
venerable history and the lack of controversy engendered by its adoption, one
commentator has suggested the Eighth Amendment (and analogous provisions in
contemporary state constitutions) might be understood as "constitutional 'boilerplate."'
Granucci, supra note 16, at 840; (footnote omitted); see also Claus, supra note 11, at 129-
30 ("For many in the founding generation, [the language of the Eighth Amendment] had
become the verbiage of civility, and they were intent on employing it for whatever it was
worth. Like the Latin Mass, it was valued by those for whom it was cultural heritage,
whether understood or not.").
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these traditional rights is particularly important in light of the
common Founding-era claim that "Americans had all the rights of
English subjects."2 1 Thus, for example, Joseph Story suggests the
Eighth Amendment is best read in light of its purpose: Namely, that
"[it was... adopted, as an admonition to all departments of the
national government, to warn them against such violent proceedings,
as had taken place in England in the arbitrary reigns of some of the
Stuarts"-a time when, among other things, "[elnormous fines and
amercements were ... sometimes imposed."22 In short, at the time of
the Founding the phrase "excessive fines" was-like the phrase "cruel
and unusual punishments"-understood to be linked in important
ways to the meaning of analogous legal protections in English
history." As a result, historical analysis has often featured
21. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983). As George Mason, drafter of the
Virginia Bill of Rights, noted in 1766, "We claim Nothing but the Liberties & Privileges of
Englishmen, in the same Degree, as if we had still continued among our Brethren in Great
Britain . .. We have received [these rights] from our Ancestors, and, with God's Leave, we
will transmit them, unimpaired to our Posterity." Letter to the Committee of Merchants
in London (June 6, 1766), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 71 (Rutland ed.
1970), quoted in Solem, 463 U.S. at 285 n.10. See also infra note 127 and accompanying
text.
22. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1896, at 750-51 (1833).
23. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment,
101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1221-22 & n.127 (1992) (suggesting that documents such as the
English Bill of Rights of 1689 and the Magna Carta were "the fountainhead of the
common law, and the widely understood source of many particular rights that later
appeared in the federal Bill, sometimes in identical language," and noting that "[t]he
language of the Eighth Amendment substitutes 'shall not be' for 'ought not to be,' but is
otherwise identical" to the English Bill of Rights). And, as another scholar suggests, "The
founding generation's failure to have more public conversations about what the Eighth
Amendment meant suggests that many of its members were uncritically claiming a liberty
of their heritage, and expected it to mean what it bad always meant." Claus, supra note
11, at 134. The phrase "excessive fines" can thus appropriately be regarded as a
preexisting legal term of art. On the role of terms of art in constitutional interpretation
generally, see Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 491-98 (2007); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132
(2003); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 54-56 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1120244. Cf.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) ("[Wihere Congress borrows terms
of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed
word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey
to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed."); Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 597 (2008); see generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REv. 747,
791 (1999) ("Legal words and phrases can sometimes be used as terms of art, with nuances
of meaning not well captured by standard dictionaries reflecting lay usage. Often we seek
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prominently in the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.24
the meaning of a word cluster-a phrase-rather than of a single word..."). For early
examples of this form of constitutional interpretation, see United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S.
150, 160 (1833) ("The [C]onstitution gives to the president, in general terms, 'the power to
grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States.' As this power had
been exercised, from time immemorial, by the executive of that nation whose language is
our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt
their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books
for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would
avail himself of it."); see also Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422 (1885) ("The scope and
effect of this, as of many other provisions of the Constitution, are best ascertained by
bearing in mind what the law was before."); see generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET
AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 49 n.1
(6th ed. 2009) (noting that the Supreme Court "has frequently stated that legal concepts
informed the understanding of technical legal terms used in drafting the Constitution").
24. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998); Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257 (1989); Solem, 463 U.S. at 277; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240-57 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring); see also Stephen R. McAllister, A Pragmatic Approach to the
Eighth Amendment and Punitive Damages, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 761, 768 (1995) (noting
that Justice Blackmun's "majority opinion [in Browning-Ferris] adopted a strict originalist
approach"); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1117 & n.32 (1990) (citing Browning-Ferris in support of the
proposition that "even those Justices and commentators who believe that the historical
meaning is not dispositive ordinarily agree that it is a relevant consideration"); Richards,
supra note 2, at 834-40 (presenting an illuminating case study of the Court's employment
of historical analysis in the opinions of Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy in Austin,
and concluding that "[t]he [Austin] Court seemed clear in its belief that an original
understanding of the Eighth Amendment was not only discoverable, but also should be
applied and entitled to great weight, only to be abandoned in the event of significant
countervailing policy considerations"); see generally John F. Manning, The Eleventh
Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1696 &
n.131 (2004) (citing, inter alia, Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275-76, and suggesting that
"the Court's articulated frame of reference, at least for matters of first impression,
virtually always builds upon some notion of fidelity to historical or original understanding
of the adopted text"). While my goal in this piece is emphatically not to litigate the virtues
of originalism as an interpretative method vis-A-vis other approaches, I do accept the
Supreme Court's repeated statements that historical context is at least of relevance to the
interpretive enterprise. Moreover, once one elects to rely on the historical meanings
associated with this provision (as the Supreme Court repeatedly has), then it surely
becomes important to explore in detail the actual contours of historical understandings
regarding the Excessive Fines Clause, and to examine the potential implications of a
constitutional jurisprudence that faithfully reflected these understandings. Cf John F.
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Unusual": The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel
Innovation, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1739, 1743-44 (2008) (characterizing as uncontroversial
the notion "that the original meaning of the text is relevant to constitutional
interpretation, whatever one's position in the larger originalism/nonoriginalism debate"
and suggesting "that it is therefore worthwhile to seek to determine the original meaning
of constitutional text where that meaning has previously been ignored or
underdeveloped").
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A. United States v. Bajakajian
In June 1994, Hosep Bajakajian and his family attempted to
depart the United States with $357,144 in U.S. currency.' Federal
customs law mandated that any amount over $10,000 be reported to
customs inspectors." Consequently, pursuant to federal statute,27 the
funds were subject to forfeiture proceedings in U.S. district court.
The Supreme Court-in an opinion authored by Justice Thomas and
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-concluded
that forfeiture of the entire amount would violate the Excessive Fines
Clause. The Court focused much of its discussion on a historical
analysis of Eighth Amendment. On the basis of this analysis, the
Court then concluded that "[t]he touchstone of the constitutional
inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of
proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some
relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to
punish." 8 Recognizing that none of the historical sources examined
"suggests how disproportional to the gravity of an offense a fine must
be in order to be deemed constitutionally excessive,"29 the Court then
turned to its prior "gross disproportionality" case law, developed in
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause context." Under this
framework, a sentence is unconstitutional if it is "grossly
disproportionate" to the offense." Applying this framework, the
Court then compared the severity of the offense ("depriv[ing the
United States] of the information that $357,144 had left the
country"") with the penalty (the forfeiture of the $357,144) and
concluded that the forfeiture in question was "grossly disproportional
to the gravity of [the] offense."3
25. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324-25.
26. 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a) (2006).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2006).
28. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334. The Court here echoed Justice Scalia's concurrence
in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993). In that opinion, Justice Scalia had
suggested that "[ijn the case of a monetary fine, the Eighth Amendment's origins in the
English Bill of Rights, intended to limit the abusive penalties assessed against the King's
opponents, demonstrate that the touchstone is value of the fine in relation to the offense."
Id. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
29. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336.
30. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
31. Id. at 288.
32. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339.
33. Id. at 339-40.
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B. Post-Bajakajian Excessive Fines Clause Doctrine in the Lower
Courts
In the years since it was decided, Bajakajian has been widely
cited in the lower courts." Nevertheless, modern Excessive Fines
Clause jurisprudence remains in many respects inchoate" and-in the
absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court-a number of
areas of doctrinal uncertainty have emerged."
First, there are a number of open questions relating to the
domain of the Excessive Fines Clause. For example, there is
disagreement among the circuit courts of appeal on the issue of
whether the Clause applies to the forfeiture of proceeds from
unlawful activities (or, more precisely, there is disagreement on
whether such forfeitures are capable of functioning in a punitive
capacity, or are instead inherently remedial)." Various courts have
34. A Westlaw search reveals that Bajakajian has been cited in 459 lower federal
court opinions, in 223 state court opinions, and in over 1,700 appellate court documents.
35. See generally Lee, supra note 9, at 692 n.72 (noting that "a distinct excessive fines
jurisprudence has yet to develop").
36. One commentator, for example, suggests that "Bajakajian's narrow holding and
fact-specific rationale add little to our understanding of the constitutional limitations the
Excessive Fines Clause imposes on the government" and that the decision "provides only
limited guidance to future parties and the lower courts about the scope and applicability of
the Excessive Fines Clause." Matthew C. Solomon, Note, The Perils of Minimalism:
United States v. Bajakajian in the Wake of the Supreme Court's Civil Double Jeopardy
Excursion, 87 GEO. L.J. 849, 876, 884 (1999); see also Barclay Thomas Johnson, Note,
Restoring Civility-the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Baby Steps Towards a
More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1062-64 (2002) (suggesting
that the scope of the Bajakajian holding is limited).
37. Compare United States v. Jalaram, Inc., 599 F.3d 347, 354 (4th Cir. 2010)
(determining "that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to the forfeiture of proceeds"), and
United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the
forfeiture of proceeds from unlawful activities was subject to Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis), and United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 543, 558 (6th Cir. 2000)
(same) with United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 250 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the Eighth Amendment does not apply to drug proceeds forfeiture) and United States v.
Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 1994) ("The forfeiture of proceeds of illegal drug sales
serves... wholly remedial purposes...."); see also Amanda Seals Bersinger, Note,
Grossly Disproportional to Whose Offense? Why the (Mis)application of Constitutional
Jurisprudence on Proceeds Forfeiture Matters, 45 GA. L. REV. 841 (2011) (discussing this
circuit split); but see Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture As Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J.
1039, 1121 n.307 (2002) (suggesting that the Constitution imposes no limits on the
"forfeiture of proceeds of a crime ... because such proceeds are not 'fines' but rather
'fruits'). Courts and commentators have also noted the lack of guidance on whether the
standard articulated in Bajakajian (an in personam forfeiture) applies to in rem forfeiture
actions. See, e.g., United States v. 45 Claremont Street, 395 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The
Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the 'grossly disproportional' standard
applies to in rem civil forfeiture actions."); Marc S. Roy, United States Federal Forfeiture
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expressed uncertainty as to whether the Excessive Fines Clause
applies to corporations." Although the Supreme Court has explicitly
concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause is inapplicable to punitive
damage awards in private litigation," there is significant uncertainty
among the lower courts on the issue of whether the Clause may be
invoked in the context of qui tam actions. 0 Doctrinal confusion has
Law: Current Status and Implications of Expansion, 69 Miss. L.J. 373, 417 (1999) ("The in
rem/in personam method of classification of forfeitures has, and continues to, foster
confusion in the law."); but see, e.g., Von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 184 (2d Cir.
2007) (suggesting that the Bajakajian Court "seemed to declare in sweeping language that
punitive forfeitures-regardless of whether they proceed in rem or in personam-are
excessive if they are 'grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense")
(quotation omitted). For discussions of the Supreme Court's lack of guidance on
constitutional forfeiture analysis generally, see Johnson, supra note 36, at 1064 (noting
"the lack of clarity" in the Court's Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence and suggesting
"the lower courts are split on what test is applicable when a challenge is raised to a
forfeiture under the Eighth Amendment.").
38. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 276 n.22 (stating that "we [shall not] decide
whether the Eighth Amendment protects corporations as well as individuals"); United
States v. Chaplin's, Inc., 646 F.3d 846, 851 n.15 (11th Cir. 2011) ("The Supreme Court has
never held that this amendment applies to corporations."); United States v. Pilgrim
Market Corp., 944 F.2d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 1991) (characterizing the notion that the Excessive
Fines Clause applies to corporations as "a very tenuous assumption"); see generally
Elizabeth Salisbury Warren, Note, The Case for Applying the Eighth Amendment to
Corporations, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1313 (1996) (noting the lack of doctrinal clarity on this
issue and suggesting a number of factors that militate in favor of extending the protections
of the Eighth Amendment to corporations).
39. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 257.
40. See Id. at 276 n.21 (expressly declining to decide the issue of whether the
Excessive Fines Clause applies to qui tam actions); United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449,
453 (7th Cir. 2008) ("It is far from clear that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to civil
actions under the False Claims Act."); Hays v. Hoffman, 2001 WL 1141827 (D. Minn.
Aug. 22, 2001) rev'd in part on other grounds, 325 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Whether the
Excessive Fines Clause actually applies to any fine imposed under these circumstances, is
murky at best."); CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS AcT: FRAUD AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT § 7:20 (2012) ("It is unclear how the Court would ultimately resolve the
question of whether forfeitures in a civil False Claims Act case constitute punishment for
purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause."); United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 2001) ("We conclude the civil sanctions provided by the False Claims Act are subject
to analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause because the sanctions represent a payment to
the government, at least in part, as punishment."); see generally Evan Caminker, The
Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 372 n.157 (1989) (suggesting that
Browning-Ferris's "reasoning makes clear that the applicability of various constitutional
rules designed to protect defendants from prosecutorial overreaching may turn on the
public nature of the prosecuting authority rather than on the nature of the sovereign's
interest in the litigation" and that "the same distinction between the United States as a
juridical entity and the government as an institutional entity applies to particular
procedural rules governing adjudication of qui tam actions as well"); Suzanne E. Durrell,
The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the Civil False Claims Act: To
United States v. Bajakajian and Beyond, 27 FALSE CL. ACT & QuI TAM Q. REV. 9 (2002)
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been exacerbated by a lack of clarity even on the basic question of
whether the Excessive Fines Clause has been incorporated against the
states.
Apart from issues relating to the scope of the Clause's
protection, there is also at least some doctrinal uncertainty associated
with each of the following three issues: (1) how to conceptualize a
penalty's harshness for constitutional purposes,42 (2) how to
determine the severity of a given offense for the purposes of the
disproportionality analysis,' and (3) how to determine the point at
which the relationship between a given penalty and a given offense
becomes unconstitutionally disproportionate." In other words, each
circuit has had to develop its own version of the Bajakajian/Solem
multi-factor "gross disproportionality" test, with the "gross
(discussing the potential applicability of the Excessive Fines Clause to qui tam actions);
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939, 967 (2002)
(suggesting that "the conclusion appears inescapable that the FCA's civil damages and
penalties formula constitutes 'punishment' for Eighth Amendment purposes").
41. See discussion infra notes 154-168 and accompanying text.
42. For example, see cases cited infra note 226.
43. Courts have diverged, for example, on the issue of what role the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines should play in determining the severity of the offense. Some lower
courts have followed the approach taken by the Court in Bajakajian, looking to the
relevant Guidelines range as an indicium of the offense's severity. See, e.g., United States
v. 3814 NW Thurman St., 164 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Beras, 183
F.3d 22, 27 n.5 (1st Cir. 1999); Von Hofe, 492 F.3d at 187. Other courts, in contrast, have
focused their analysis on the relationship between the penalty imposed and the statutory
maximum. See, e.g., United States v. Yu Tian Li, 615 F.3d 752, 757 (7th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Rico-Hernandez, 350 F. App'x 653, 655 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v.
Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 342 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d
1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that "if the value of forfeited property is within the
range of fines prescribed by Congress, a strong presumption arises that the forfeiture is
constitutional") (footnote omitted). Indeed, one court of appeals has, somewhat
remarkably, concluded that there is "no constitutional violation when the forfeiture does
not exceed the maximum fine allowed by statute," seemingly suggesting that a penalty
within the statutory maximum is subject to an irrebuttable presumption of
constitutionality. United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1072-73 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Such an approach would appear to be flatly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
suggestion that "no penalty is per se constitutional." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290
(1983). For a discussion of the Court's use of the sentencing guidelines in Bajakajian as a
severity heuristic, see Johnson, supra note 2, at 515; see generally Colleen P. Murphy,
Reviewing Congressionally Created Remedies for Excessiveness, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 651, 698-
99 (2012) (noting the split among those courts that have held within-maximum monetary
penalties per se constitutional and those that have not, and suggesting that the former
approach "seemingly confine[s] the analysis in Bajakajian to asset forfeiture").
44. One might think of these as the "numerator problem," "denominator problem,"
and "ratio problem," respectively.
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disproportionality" determination often characterized as an
inherently fact-intensive inquiry."$
One area of near-consensus among the lower federal courts has,
however, emerged: the large majority of lower courts have appeared
to read Bajakajian as foreclosing an inquiry into the personal
financial or economic characteristics of a defendant for the purposes
of an Excessive Fines Clause analysis. For example, the Eleventh
Circuit, citing Bajakajian, has concluded that "excessiveness is
determined in relation to the characteristics of the offense, not in
relation to the characteristics of the offender,"6 and, in another case,
has stated that "we do not take into account the personal impact of a
forfeiture on the specific defendant in determining whether the
forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment."47  Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit has suggested that "an Eighth Amendment gross
disproportionality analysis does not require an inquiry into the
hardship the sanction may work on the offender."" The Eighth
Circuit appears to have reached a similar conclusion.4 9 Other
circuits-while not explicitly holding that personal financial hardship
and a defendant's characteristics are irrelevant to the excessiveness
determination-have simply not taken such factors into account in
the course of their analysis.' However, a close reading of
45. See Von Hofe, 492 F.3d at 186 ("Determining the excessiveness of a civil in rem
forfeiture is necessarily fact-intensive . . . ."); see also United States v. Bieri, 68 F.3d 232,
236 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that "courts must engage in a fact-intensive analysis under the
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause"); cf Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 364 (1922)
("There being no definitely fixed rules or standards for determining what are and what are
not excessive fines, each case, whether a statute prescribing fines or a judgment imposing a
fine under a statute, must be adjudged on its merits...."). Although the precise list of
factors employed thus varies by circuit, a consensus has developed that the inquiry
demands, at a minimum, a consideration of the factors considered by the Bajakajian court:
namely, "(1) the essence of the crime and its relation to other criminal activity; (2)
whether the defendant fit into the class of persons for whom the statute was principally
designed; (3) the maximum sentence and fine that could have been imposed; and (4) the
nature of the harm caused by the defendant's conduct." United States v. Malewicka, 664
F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, as the Court in Solem
emphasized, "no one factor will be dispositive in a given case" and "no single criterion can
identify when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth
Amendment." 463 U.S. at 291 n.16.
46. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d at 1311.
47. United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1292 n.11 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted).
48. United States v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 1998).
49. United States v. Smith, 656 F.3d 821, 828-29 (8th Cir. 2011).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Malewicka, 664 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Zakharia, 418 F. App'x 414, 422 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Sabhnani, 599
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Bajakajian-and of the text, history, and purpose of the Excessive
Fines Clause itself-suggests this consensus may well be mistaken.
C. The Case Against the Majority Approach
There are three potential problems with this majority approach.
First, it is simply not correct to regard Bajakajian's holding as
compelling a lower court to disregard a defendant's personal
circumstances when undertaking an Excessive Fines Clause analysis.
Second, the majority approach is arguably inconsistent with the
analytical frameworks the Supreme Court has adopted in other
Eighth Amendment contexts. Third, attempts to justify the majority
approach on historical grounds have relied upon an incomplete and
selective reading of the historical record.
First, it is simply not the case that, as some lower courts have
suggested, Bajakajian's holding requires that a defendant's means be
disregarded when undertaking an Excessive Fines Clause analysis.
Because the Supreme Court in Bajakajian found that the forfeiture
was "grossly disproportional to the gravity of his offense,"" the Court
did not reach issues associated with the defendant's wealth, income,
or livelihood. Indeed, Justice Thomas's opinion expressly reserved
judgment on issues relating to the interface between the Excessive
Fines Clause and considerations of "livelihood" or ability to pay,
stating that "[r]espondent does not argue that his wealth or income
are relevant to the proportionality determination or that full
forfeiture would deprive him of his livelihood ... and the District
Court made no factual findings in this respect."5 2 Several
commentators and courts have recognized this: as one author
observed following the Bajakajian Court's decision, "The Court ...
left unresolved whether courts' assessments of the severity of
punishment should vary depending on individual defendants' ability
to pay."" Thus, in light of the Court's explicit reservation of
F.3d 215, 262 (2d Cir. 2010); Newell Recycling Co., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 231 F.3d 204, 210
(5th Cir. 2000).
51. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 339.
52. Id. at 340.
53. Comment, Excessive Fines Clause, 112 HARV. L. REV. 152, 158 (1998); see also id.
("Justice Thomas merely mentioned that Bajakajian 'does not argue that his wealth or
income are relevant to the proportionality determination' and left the issue undecided.");
Durrell, supra note 40, at 9 n.1 (noting that "[tihe [Bajakajian] Court did not decide
whether a defendant's wealth or income ... were relevant factors"). Several courts have
also explicitly recognized the limited nature of the Court's holding. See, e.g., United States
v. Bader, 07-CR-00338-MSK, 2010 WL 2681707, at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. July 1, 2010)
(concluding that, in light of Bajakajian's narrow holding, it is "not clear to what extent"
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judgment on the issue of livelihood and ability to pay, the Court's
statement that "[t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under
the Excessive Fines Clause is . . . [that the] amount of the forfeiture
must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense" is properly
read as a statement simply to the effect that proportionality was the
"touchstone" of the constitutional analysis in Bajakajian-that is, in a
case in which non-proportionality aspects of the Excessive Fines
Clause were not at bar.54 Properly understood, therefore,
Bajakajian's holding does not require that proportionality between
penalty and offense represent the entirety of the Excessive Fines
Clause analysis in all cases."
Second, a conclusion that a defendant's personal characteristics
are not to be considered for Excessive Fines Clause purposes is also
somewhat in tension with other aspects of the Supreme Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. For example, in the context of
determining the excessiveness vel non of a judicially imposed fine for
contempt, the Court has indicated that "a court which has returned a
conviction for contempt must, in fixing the amount of a fine to be
imposed as a punishment. . . , consider the amount of defendant's
financial resources and the consequent seriousness of the burden to
that particular defendant.",6  Similarly, in the context of the Court's
the issue of "the effect that... a forfeiture will have on [an individual]" "is a factor that is
appropriately considered"); One 1995 Toyota Pick-Up Truck v. Dist. of Columbia, 718
A.2d 558, 565 n.15 (D.C. 1998) (concluding that the Bajakajian court "appears to have left
open the prospect that other factors may be included in the proportionality analysis, such
as the wealth of the owner of the property and the effect of the forfeiture on his or her
livelihood").
54. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334. In other words, in Bajakajian the Court established
gross disproportionality to offense merely as one avenue through which the
unconstitutional "excessiveness" of a penalty might be established. A court that simply
concludes, on the basis of the conditional premise "gross disproportionality to offense
entails unconstitutionality," that a lack of gross disproportionality conclusively refutes a
claim of unconstitutionality-would risk appearing to commit the logical fallacy of the
denial of the antecedent. See, e.g., ELIE MAYNARD ADAMS, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
GENERAL LOGIC 164 (1954) ("[D]enying the antecedent is an invalid form of the simple
conditional argument.").
55. In fact, courts have recognized that non-proportionality factors-such as ability
to pay-are likely to be of greater relevance in cases of fines, as opposed to forfeitures.
See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 88 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that
"[p]roportionality is likely to be the most important issue in a forfeiture case, since the
claimant-defendant is able to pay by forfeiting the disputed asset" but that "[iun imposing
a fine ... ability to pay becomes a critical factor"). It is thus unsurprising that
Bajakajian-a forfeiture case-did not address the non-proportionality aspects of
Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence.
56. United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947); see also
Cordray, supra note 2, at 459 (discussing this case); Craig W. Palm, RICO Forfeiture and
Summer 2013] EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE ORIGINAL MEANING
Excessive Bail Clause jurisprudence, it has been established that "the
financial ability of the defendant" is a relevant consideration.17 It is
also surely worthy of note that the Court has characterized its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence as "flow[ing] from the basic precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to both the offender and the offense."" The current
failure of the majority of lower courts to incorporate any
consideration of the effect of a fine or forfeiture on an individual
the Eighth Amendment: When Is Everything Too Much?, 53 U. PTrr. L. REV. 1, 82 (1991)
(highlighting Mine Workers as illustrative of potentially relevant factors under an
Excessive Fines Clause analysis); King, supra note 9, at 196 (situating Mine Workers within
the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and noting that "[in 1947, the Court sliced
a $3.5 million criminal contempt fine to $700,000 after finding the original sanction
excessive given the defendant's financial resources").
57. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 & n.3 (1951); see Comment, supra note 53, at 162; see
generally Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959,
997 (1965). Under Excessive Bail Clause doctrine, the relevant "excessiveness" referent is
whether the bail amount exceeds "an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill th[e]
purpose" of bail-namely, "assurance of the presence of an accused." Boyle, 342 U.S. at
5. Of course, it is true that "bail is not excessive merely because the defendant is unable to
pay it." Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679, 687 (8th Cir. 1966).
58. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012). It is certainly true that in Miller
(a Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause case), the relevant individual circumstance-
age-implicates culpability in ways that a defendant's personal economic circumstances
arguably do not. Juvenile status is perhaps appropriately regarded as sui generis, and I
certainly do not suggest that Miller speaks directly to the Excessive Fines Clause issue.
Nevertheless, the broader point-that tailoring a punishment to a defendant's individual
circumstances is a "basic precept of justice"-remains instructive. I note that a number of
theorists have suggested the socioeconomic status of an offender should inform our
assessment of that offender's culpability. See David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the
Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976); R. George Wright, The Progressive Logic of
Criminal Responsibility and the Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U. L. REV.
459 (1994); Barbara Hudson, Punishing the Poor: Dilemmas of Justice and Difference, in
FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000). However, my
account of the Eighth Amendment's economic survival norm does not rely on positing the
existence of relationship between economic status and moral culpability.
Another aspect of the Court's Cruel and Unusual Punishments jurisprudence is also
arguably informative. The Court's doctrine governing incarceration conditions is grounded
on the understanding that "when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so
restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the
same time fails to provide for his basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and reasonable safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the
Eighth Amendment." DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989). If such a quasi-fiduciary governmental obligation to provide for "basic human
needs" inheres in the Eighth Amendment for cases of incarceration, it might be suggested
that a similar obligation ought to be implicated when the state affirmatively takes steps to
dramatically inhibit an individual's ability to provide for him or herself through the
imposition of crushing economic penalties.
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defendant renders doctrine in these circuits arguably somewhat in
tension with the logic of these aspects of Supreme Court case law.
Finally, it is incongruous (and historiographically suspect) for
courts adopting the majority view to cite the lengthy history of
excessive fines protections in Anglo-American law for the proposition
that the Excessive Fines Clause incorporates a proportionality
principle, while simultaneously ignoring the fact that these same
historical sources overwhelmingly suggest that a central purpose of
historical excessive fines provisions was to protect against fines that
were excessive in relation to a defendant's estate (and thus
destructive of a defendant's capacity for economic self-sufficiency)."
I examine this history in Parts II and III, infra.
D. Livelihood and the Excessive Fines Clause in the First Circuit
In contrast to the majority approach to Excessive Fines Clause
jurisprudence stands the approach adopted by the First Circuit.6 The
59. For example, in United States v. One Parcel Prop. Located at 427 & 429 Hall St.,
Montgomery, Montgomery Cnty., Ala., 74 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 1996), the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that for the purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause, "appropriate inquiry with
respect to the Excessive Fines Clause is, and is only, a proportionality test." Id. at 1170.
In support of this proposition, the court cited the first half of Chapter Fourteen of the
Magna Carta ("A freeman shall not be amerced for a small fault but after the manner of
the fault; and for a great crime according to the heinousness of it . . . ."), but neglected the
quote the second half of the relevant provision ("saving to him his contenement; and a
Merchant likewise, saving to him his merchandise; and any other's villain than ours shall
be likewise amerced, saving his wainage"). The 429 Hall St. court did not venture an
explanation as to why the first half of this sentence was dispositive as to the meaning of
the Excessive Fines Clause, while the second half was irrelevant.
60. Although my focus in this section is on the First Circuit's emergent doctrinal
framework, I note parenthetically that there is also some authority under Eighth Circuit
case law for the proposition that the Excessive Fines Clause prohibits the imposition of
fines that exceed a defendant's ability to pay. However, the leading Eighth Circuit case
simply asserts the proposition as a matter of ipse dixit and provides no other support for
the inclusion of ability to pay as a relevant constitutional factor (whether based on text,
history, precedent, or otherwise). See United States v. Hines, 88 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir.
1996) ("Proportionality is likely to be the most important issue in a forfeiture case, since
the claimant-defendant is able to pay by forfeiting the disputed asset. In imposing a fine,
on the other hand, ability to pay becomes a critical factor. But the [Federal Sentencing]
Guidelines mandate that this factor be considered ... and if the sentencing court complies
with these provisions, any constitutional ability-to-pay limitation will necessarily be
met."); see also United States v. Lippert, 148 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[I1n the case
of fines... the defendant's ability to pay is a factor under the Excessive Fines Clause.");
Hays v. Hoffman, 97-CV-1656(JMR/FLN), 2001 WL 1141827, at *3 n.6 (D. Minn. Aug. 22,
2001) rev'd in part on other grounds, 325 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 2003) ("A defendant's ability
to pay a fine is a factor under the Excessive Fines Clause."). That said, I would suggest
that this line of cases (while perhaps undertheorized) nevertheless gives voice to the
powerful intuition that the basic notion of "excessiveness" is capacious enough to
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First Circuit began to develop an alternative doctrinal framework for
Excessive Fines Clause claims in a 2007 case, United States v. Jose."
In that case, defendant Otilio Jose appealed from a forfeiture order
entered by the U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico.6 Jose argued that
the forfeiture of $114,948 in unreported U.S. currency by U.S.
customs officials constituted a constitutionally excessive fine. The
First Circuit highlighted the historical link the Bajakajian court drew
between the Excessive Fines Clause and the Magna Carta, and then,
citing the text of Chapter 14 of the Magna Carta,' concluded that
"[g]iven the history behind the Excessive Fines Clause, it is
appropriate to consider whether the forfeiture in question would
deprive Jose of his livelihood.""
encompass the consideration of a defendant's individual economic circumstances. See
generally Murphy, supra note 43, at 700 (noting that "[t]he [federal] appellate courts are
divided as to whether the defendant's ability to pay is a factor under the Excessive Fines
Clause"). In addition, courts in six states have suggested that the ability to pay might, at
least in certain circumstances, be a relevant consideration in determining whether a fine is
constitutionally disproportionate. These determinations have been made on the basis of
the federal Excessive Fines Clause, analogous state constitutional provisions, or both. In
Colorado, see People v. Pourat, 100 P.3d 503, 507 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); and People v.
Malone, 923 P.2d 163, 166 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). For further discussion, see SULLIVAN &
FRASE, supra note 9, at 152, which briefly discusses Malone and suggests "[tlhe ability-to-
pay factor identifies either a new form of excessiveness or one indirectly related to ends or
means proportionality." This Article proposes that the former suggestion-that this line
of cases represents a new (or, at least, largely unexplored) form of excessiveness-is
essentially correct. In California, see People v. Roscoe, 169 Cal. App. 4th 829, 840, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 187, 196 (2008); Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 37 Cal. 4th 707, 728, 124
P.3d 408, 421 (2005); San Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1302, 1321-22, 92 Cal. Rptr.
2d 418, 432 (2000). In Pennsylvania, see Commonwealth v. Heggenstaller, 699 A.2d 767,
769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). In Arizona, see, e.g., State v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc., 224
Ariz. 173, 201 (Ct. App. 2010). In New York, see People v. Ingham, 453 N.Y.S.2d 325, 328
(City Ct. 1982); and County of Nassau v. Moloney, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 2, 2002, at 228, col. 2
(Nass. Co. Sup. Ct). Finally, for a discussion of recent Oregon jurisprudence that builds
on the First Circuit's Jose/Levesque line of cases, see infra note 74.
61. United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2007).
62. The forfeiture order was entered subject to the bulk cash smuggling provisions of
the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub.L. No. 107-56, § 371, 115 Stat. 272, 336-38 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5332).
63. Magna Charta, 9 Hen. III, ch. 14 (1225), 1 STAT. AT LARGE 6-7 (1762 ed.) ("A
Free-man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for
a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him his contenement; (2) and a
Merchant likewise, saving to him his merchandise; (3) and any other's villain than ours
shall be likewise amerced, saving his wainage.").
64. Jose, 499 F.3d at 113. The Jose court ultimately concluded that "[it cannot
reasonably be argued that forfeiture of the $114,948 would deprive defendant of his
livelihood because "according to Jose's own words, the money wasn't his to start with...
[s]o whether the government forfeits it or not, it is really of no consequence to him
because it wasn't his to be forfeited." Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
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The First Circuit further developed this analytical framework in
the 2008 case of United States v. Levesque.6 In Levesque, the court
considered an Excessive Fines Clause challenge to a district court's
imposition of a money judgment totaling over $3 million on an
alleged drug "mule."" Although the Levesque court acknowledged
that the district court had correctly applied the circuit's standard test
for gross disproportionality in fines and forfeitures (a test based on
the factors articulated in Bajakajian 6 ), the court reaffirmed that this
"is not the end of the inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause."68
Noting that the Supreme Court in Bajakajian appeared to "treat[] as
distinct [from the "gross excessiveness" inquiry] the question of
whether a forfeiture would deprive a defendant of his livelihood,"69
the Levesque court then undertook a brief review of the history of the
Excessive Fines Clause (and analogous excessive fines protections in
English law),70 concluding that "the notion that a forfeiture should not
be so great as to deprive a wrongdoer of his or her livelihood is
deeply rooted in the history of the Eighth Amendment."7 1
Although the Levesque court stated that "a defendant's inability
to satisfy a forfeiture at the time of conviction, in and of itself, is not
at all sufficient to render a forfeiture unconstitutional," the court
nevertheless concluded that "it is not inconceivable that a forfeiture
could be so onerous as to deprive a defendant of his or her future
ability to earn a living, thus implicating the historical concerns
underlying the Excessive Fines Clause."" Consequently, the First
Circuit vacated the district court's forfeiture order and remanded the
case for a consideration of whether the proposed forfeiture would
have been barred under this test.
The court noted in Levesque that a number of aspects of the First
Circuit's evolving Excessive Fines Clause "livelihood" jurisprudence
65. United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78 (1st Cir, 2008). Both Jose and Levesque
were authored by Judge Sandra Lynch.
66. Levesque, 546 F.3d at 79-80.
67. See United States v. Heldeman, 402 F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 2005). As an aside,
note that the subsequent development of the Jose/Levesque line of cases must be regarded
as superseding Heldeman's suggestion that "[a] forfeiture will violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition only if it is 'grossly disproportional to the gravity of the
defendant's offense.' Id. (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336-37) (emphasis added).
68. Levesque, 546 F.3d at 83.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 83-84.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 85,
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 40:4852
Summer 20131 EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE ORIGINAL MEANING
remain inchoate." Nevertheless, by incorporating a consideration of
the defendant's livelihood into the excessiveness calculus, the First
Circuit has taken a significant step towards a more historically
grounded Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence.4 Below, I provide a
review of this history-focusing in particular on the traditional
English common law principle of salvo contenemento-so as to
contextualize and defend the First Circuit's emergent doctrinal
framework.
II. The Principle of Salvo Contenemento
In this Part, I briefly review the history of the legal concept of
salvo contenemento in English law. The phrase itself is most
prominently associated with the Magna Carta of 1215, although
aspects of this principle appear to predate that document."
73. Id.
74. In July 2012, the Court of Appeals of Oregon, relying on both Levesque and
Bajakajian, took a further step toward developing this emerging strand of Excessive Fines
Clause jurisprudence. In State v. Goodenow, 251 Or.App. 139 (2012), the defendant
challenged a forfeiture of $960,843 in lottery winnings received from lottery tickets that
had been bought with an illegally acquired credit card. Although the Oregon court
ultimately concluded the forfeiture of these winnings did not constitute an excessive fine,
the test articulated in Goodenow is instructive. The Goodenow court concluded, in light
of "the history of the Excessive Fines Clause and its purpose of protecting defendants'
livelihoods and self-sufficiency," it was appropriate to consider both "the amount of [a]
forfeiture and the effect of the forfeiture on the defendant." Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
The court thus suggested that "[wihether an otherwise proportional fine is excessive can
depend on, for example, the financial resources available to a defendant, the other
financial obligations of the defendant, and the effect of the fine on the defendant's ability
to be self-sufficient." Id.
75. A pre-Magna Carta writ known as de moderata misericordia (under which
unjustly large fines could be reduced) is attested by the twelfth century; Glanvill's treatise
(dating to circa 1188) states that "[a]mercement by the lord king... means that he is to be
amerced by the oath of lawful men of the neighborhood, but so as not to lose any property
necessary to maintain his position." THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE
REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL 114 (G.D.G. Hall ed., 1965)
(emphasis added). Perhaps the most extensive discussion of the writ of moderata
misericordia is found in ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, LA NOVELLE NATURA BREvIUM 167-
71 (1534). Scholars have also noted parallels between these provisions and the ius
commune. See, e.g., R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the lus Commune, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 297, 326-29 (1999) (citing C.9 q.3 c.1; C.14 q. 6 c. 1; C.15 q. 3 c. 4; and C.24 q. 1 c. 21)
(discussing parallels between Magna Carta's amercements provisions and certain aspects
of the Decretum Gratiani, and noting by way of comparison that "the seed, animals, and
tillage necessary for the livelihood of rustici were given special protection against
incursion under the ius commune"). Coke suggests that somewhat analogous livelihood-
protection provisions that protected implements of husbandry from being seized in cases
of distresses, as codified in the Statute of Marlborough, 52 Hen. III (1267), find their origin
in pre-Roman British law. See EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES
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A. Magna Carta
Chapter 14 of the Magna Carta governs the assessment of
amercements, an early form of fines." Translated from the original
Latin, the document reads as follows:
A freeman shall not be amerced for a slight offence,
except in accordance with the degree of the offence;
and for a grave offence he shall be amerced in
accordance with the gravity of the offence, yet saving
always his "contenement" [salvo contenemento suo];
and a merchant in the same way, saving his
"merchandise"; and a villein shall be amerced in the
same way, saving his "waynage "-if they have fallen
into our mercy: and none of the aforesaid
amercements shall be imposed except by the oath of
honest men of the neighbourhood.
In an often-quoted passage, a leading nineteenth century legal
historian suggests that "[vjery likely there was no clause in Magna
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people than that about
amercements." 8 The exact meaning of the word "contenement" has
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 132 (London, E & R Brooke 1797) (1628); but see, e.g., 2
JOHN EDWARD LLOYD, A HISTORY OF WALES FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE
EDWARDIAN CONQUEST 527 (3d ed. 1939) (suggesting that the history upon which
Coke's account relies may in fact have been apocryphal). For an interesting discussion of
the plow sanctuary in medieval English history generally, see James H. Morey, Plows,
Laws, and Sanctuary in Medieval England and in the Wakefield Mactacio Abel, 95 STUD.
PHILOLOGY 41 (1998).
76. Originally, the terms "fines" and "amercements" referred to different forms of
payments. See JOHN Fox, CONTEMPT OF COURT 118-201 (1927) (providing an extensive
discussion on the differences between these two forms of monetary penalties, and on the
history of both fines and amercements). However, by the eighteenth century, the terms
were often used interchangeably and Magna Carta's traditional framework came to be
seen as governing the calculation of fines as well. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10,
at *372-73 (describing Magna Carta's amercements provisions as governing "the
reasonableness of fines in criminal cases").
77. Magna Charta, 9 Hen. III, ch. 14 (1225), 1 STAT. AT LARGE 6-7 (1762 ed.)
(emphasis added). Similar provisions governing the amercement of nobles and religious
officials can be found in Chapter 15 and 16, respectively. For clarity and consistency, I
refer to the numbering of chapters adopted in the statutory form of the Magna Carta (as
enacted in 1225), not the numbering that existed in the original document signed at
Runnymede in 1215.
78. F. W. MAITLAND, PLEAS OF THE CROWN FOR THE COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER
xxxiv (1884).
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at times been a matter of some controversy," and the word has been
variously defined -as "freehold," "tenement," or "countenance.
Nevertheless, a consensus has developed as to the core meaning of
the provision. As the historian William McKechnie puts it, "to save a
man's 'contenement' was to leave him sufficient for the sustenance of
himself and those dependent on him."81 The purpose of this provision
was thus to ensure that "[i]n no case could the offender be pushed
absolutely to the wall: his means of livelihood must be saved to him.
Even if all other effects had to be sold off to pay the amount assessed,
he was to retain his "contenement."" The effect of Magna Carta's
parallel protections for "merchants" and "villeins""a was similar: By
protecting their "merchandize" and "waynage,"" respectively, a
79. See, e.g., ALEXANDER HILL EVERETT, ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF THE OLD
PARTIES, JULY 1834 ("It is difficult to give the precise meaning of this word."); see also
Henry Sherman Boutell, Seventh Centenary of Magna Carta, 3 GEO. L J. 49, 50 (1915)
(noting that "[e]ssays are still being written on the true meaning of contenermentum and
uainagium"). For discussions of various controversies that have emerged regarding the
meaning of the word, see A.F. Pollard, 'Contenementum' in Magna Carta, 27 ENG. HIST.
REV. 117 (1913); James Tait, Studies in Magna Carta: Waynagium and Contenementum,
27 ENG. HIST. REV. 720 (1912).
80. A leading eighteenth century law dictionary defines "contenement" as "that
which is needed for the Support and Maintenance of Men, according to their several
Qualities, Conditions, or States of Life." GILES JACOB & JOHN HOLT, A NEW LAW-
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1762) (unpaginated); accord WHARTON'S LAW LEXICON (1847)
(defining "contenement" as "a man's countenance or credit, which he has together with,
and by reason of, his freehold; or, that which is necessary for the support and maintenance
of men, agreeably to their several qualities of life"); HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES,
OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT'S INHERITANCE 16 (W.N. ed., 5th ed., Boston, J. Franklin
1721) (describing "the contenement of the Criminal" as "that which is necessary for his
Support, according to his Condition or State of Life; so that tho he might be amerced, yet
something must be left for his Support"); F.O., THE LAW-FRENCH DICTIONARY (1701)
(defining "contenement" as meaning "the Freehold Land which lieth to a man's
Tenement, or Dwelling-house that is in his own Occupation"). McKechnie suggests that
"[t]he word comes from the French 'contenir,' and has many shades of meaning, as
capacity, maintenance, appearance, social condition or grade." WILLIAM SHARP
McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING
JOHN 293 (2d ed. 1914).
81. MCKECHNIE, supra note 80, at 293.
82. Id. at 287.
83. The villain was a type of feudal serf. For extensive discussions regarding
medieval villainage, see generally PAUL R. HYAMS, KING, LORDS AND PEASANTS IN
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: THE COMMON LAW OF VILLEINAGE IN THE TWELFTH AND
THIRTEENTH CENTURIES (1980); PAUL VINOGRADOFF, VILLAINAGE IN ENGLAND:
ESSAYS IN ENGLISH MEDIAEVAL HISTORY (1892).
84. Coke suggests "waynage" meant "the contenement of a villain," namely "the
furniture of his cart or wain." COKE, supra note 75, at 28. Although Coke's definition has
been widely repeated, see, e.g., Massey, supra note 11, at 1276, leading historians have
sharply criticized Coke's attempt to tie the word to the Saxon word "wagna," or cart,
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minimum core level of economic viability was protected
notwithstanding the imposition of monetary penalties.
The Magna Carta's principles governing the calculation of
amercements were restated a number of times in subsequent
legislation," and a number of twelfth century examples illustrate the
manner in which these principles operated in practice. The fine rolls
of King Henry III record an order to the Sheriff of Hampshire which
refers to a penalty assessed "according to the manner of that trespass
and the quantity of their goods, saving their contenement."6 Another
such order, to the Sheriff of Somerset, describes a monetary penalty
set "according to the degree of the offence and the quantity of his
goods, saving his livelihood."" Based on extensive research into the
Winchester Pipe Rolls (a set of fine rolls that date to circa 1208-1300),
one historian concludes that "it is clear that the practice of regularly
assessing fines according to ability to pay was widespread throughout
this period.""
Notably, observance of the principle of salvo contenemento did
not require that only those fines that could be paid immediately could
be assessed. Writing in 1711, the legal scholar Thomas Madox
instead suggesting the word is more appropriately understood as "a Latinized form of the
French word 'gagnage,"' likely used to mean "tillage" or "crops." MCKECHNIE, supra
note 80, at 291-92; see also Tait, supra note 79, at 721-22. Regardless of which etymology
is correct, the overall livelihood-protection thrust of the provision remains apparent.
85. The Magna Carta itself was reaffirmed on a number of occasions. After its initial
agreement in 1215, it was passed into law in 1225, see 9 Hen. III, ch. 14 (1225), 1 STAT. AT
LARGE 6-7 (1762 ed.), and was subsequently reconfirmed on over forty different
occasions during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. See FAITH
THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH
CONSTITUTION, 1300-1629 10 (1948). Provisions regarding the calculation of
amercements, mirroring Magna Carta's, were also included in the Statute of Westminster, 3
Edw. 1, ch. 6 (1275), which required "that no City, Borough, nor Town, nor any Man be
amerced, without reasonable Cause, and according to the Quantity of his Trespass; that is
to say, every Free-man saving his Freehold, a Merchant saving his Merchandise, a Villain
saving his Waynage, and that by his or their Peers."
86. For John le Fraunceys and his associates, Fine Roll C 60/57, 44 Henry III (1259),
HENRY III FINE ROLLS PROJEct, http://www.finerollshenry3.org.uk/content/calendar/
roll_057.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
87. For Gervase de Halton, Fine Roll C 60/58, 45 Henry Ill (1261), HENRY III FINE
ROLLS PROJECT, http://www.finerollshenry3.org.uk/content/calendar/roll_058.html (last
visited Apr. 20, 2013). For other examples of thirteenth century amercement practices,
see FAITH THOMPSON, THE FIRST CENTURY OF MAGNA CARTA 46-48 (1925); and
Granucci, supra note 16, at 846.
88. Alfred N. May, An Index of Thirteenth-Century Peasant Impoverishment? Manor
Court Fines, 26 ECON. HIST. REV. 389, 398 (1973). May goes so far as to propose (as the
title of his piece suggests) that fine amounts might properly serve as a proxy for poverty
levels. Id.
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records that in the late thirteenth century, courts were enabling men
to "[s]av[e] their Contenement"-that is, "[s]aving the maintenance
of himself, his Wife and Children"-by permitting the payment of
amercement debts in "reasonable installments."'
B. English Bill of Rights
To understand the meaning of the punishment provisions of the
English Bill of Rights of 1689, it is necessary to understand the
circumstances surrounding the adoption of these provisions. By the
mid-seventeenth century, English courts had come to disregard many
of the traditional practices associated with the imposition of monetary
penalties. One writer in 1637, for example, contrasted the
contemporary practices of the Star Chamber with earlier practices
under John Whitgift, who had served as Archbishop of Canterbury
between 1583 and 1604, noting that "Arch-Bishop Whitgift did
constantly in this Court maintain the Liberty of the Free-Charter, that
none ought to be fined but salvo Contenimento: he seldom gave any
Sentence, but therein did mitigate in something the Acrimony of
those that spake before him."1 By 1641, in contrast, one advocate
would exclaim:
[T~hough Magna Charta be so sacred for antiquity;
though its confirmation be strengthened by oath,...
and assigns every subject his birthright, it only survives
89. See THOMAS MADOX, THE HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES OF THE EXCHEQUER
OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND 678 (1711). On the early fining practices in the English
courts generally, see also ARCHER MORESBY WHITE, OUTLINES OF LEGAL HISTORY
(1895):
The practice in the superior courts was to inquire what a man could
pay the king yearly, saving his maintenance, and that of his wife and
children.... Then, instead of an excessive fine which he could never
have paid, and according to the maxim qui non habet in crumena luat
in corpora [lit. "who has nothing in purse, let him suffer in body"], he
would be imprisoned until he did pay, which meant perpetual
imprisonment. Then, instead of a fine, a limited imprisonment was
inflicted.
Id. at 205. (The translation added to the above passage is the author's own.)
90. 1 Wm. & Mary, 2d Sess., ch. 2, 3 STAT. AT LARGE 440, 441 (1689) ("[Excessive
Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall
Punishments inflicted.").
91. A Discourse Concerning the High-Court of Star-Chamber (1637), reprinted in
THE STAR CHAMBER 4, 10 (John Southerden Burn ed. 1870).
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in the Rolls, but is miserably rent and torn in the
Practice. These words, "salvo contenemento," live in
the Rolls, but they are dead in the Star-chamber."
Although the Star Chamber was abolished by statute in 1641,9"
judicial abuses in the assessment of fines continued. Indeed, by the
mid-1680s, "the use of fines 'became even more excessive and
partisan,' and some opponents of the King were forced to remain in
prison because they could not pay the huge monetary penalties that
had been assessed."9
Against this backdrop, the highly publicized trial and punishment
of the Anglican cleric Titus Oates has been widely recognized as a
valuable source of information regarding contemporary
understandings of the protections against "excessive fines" and
"cruell and unusuall Punishments" in the English Bill of Rights.' In
the late 1670s, Oates had spread false reports of a Jesuit conspiracy
against King Charles II; in response, a number of leading Catholic
figures had been executed. 6 Subsequently charged with perjury,
Oates's trial at the King's Bench had been presided over by the
92. Impeachment of Sir Richard Bolton et al., 4 STATE TRIALS 53 (1641).
93. An Act for Regulating the Privy Council and for Taking Away the Court
Commonly Called the Star Chamber, 16 Car. 1, c. 10 (July 5, 1641) (Eng.); see 1 W. S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 514-16 (3d. ed.) (1922).
94. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 267
(quoting SCHWOERER, supra note 10, at 91; citing Trial of Thomas Pilkington, and others,
for a Riot, 9 STATE TRIALS 187 (1683); Trial of Sir Samuel Barnardiston, 9 STATE TRIALS
1333 (1684)). Other courts of this era appeared still to recognize Magna Carta's
limitations on criminal fines. See, e.g., Townsend v. Hughes (1677), 86 Eng. Rep. 994
(C.P.) 994 ("In cases of fines for criminal matters, a man is to be fined by Magna Charta
with a salvo contenemento suo; and no fine is to be imposed greater than he is able to
pay.").
95. See, e.g., Granucci, supra note 16, at 856 (concluding that "[f]or positive evidence
of what the framers of the Declaration of Rights intended to prohibit, we must look to
Titus Oates and the infamous 'Popish Plot' of 1678-79"); see generally id. at 856-60
(discussing the Oates case). Although some writers have suggested it was Judge Jeffreys's
so-called "Bloody Assize" that inspired the English provision, see, e.g., IRVING BRANT,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 155 (1965), most modern sources agree
it is the trial of Titus Oates and similar abuses in the Court of King's Bench that served as
the immediate catalyst.
96. For extensive background on Titus Oates and the "Popish Plot," see PETER
HINDS, "THE HORRID POPISH PLOT": ROGER L'ESTRANGE AND THE CIRCULATION OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN LATE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY LONDON (2010); JOHN
PHILIPPS KENYON, THE POPISH PLOT (1972).
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notorious Judge Jeffreys.9 Sentenced in 1685 to "(1) a fine of 2,000
marks, (2) life imprisonment, (3) whippings, (4) pilloring four times a
year and (5) to be defrocked,"98 Oates in 1688 petitioned Parliament
in an attempt to have his sentence overturned. Oates's appeal was
rejected by the House of Lords, but several members dissented on the
grounds that the sentence handed down was "contrary to the
declaration ... that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel nor unusual punishments
inflicted.""9 The House of Commons then appeared to adopt the
views of the dissenting lords,"' with one member claiming that the
sentence was "cruel and illegal.,,... Modern scholars" and courts"o3
have recognized that understanding the nature of the dispute over the
penalty and sentence in Oates's case-a major dispute over the
legality of a particularly high-profile punishment-is relevant to
understanding the scope of the rights protections codified in the
English Bill of Rights. It is thus instructive that, in his appeal to the
House of Lords to overturn his sentence, Oates characterized his fine
as excessive not solely in relation to his culpability, but also in
97. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 87 (1998) ("[In the late eighteenth century, every schoolboy in
America knew that the English Bill of Rights' 1689 ban on excessive bail, excessive fines,
and cruel and unusual punishments-a ban repeated virtually verbatim in the Eighth
Amendment-arose as a response to the gross misbehavior of the infamous Judge
Jeffreys."). Although Jeffreys's abuses were myriad, and certainly not limited to the
imposition of "excessive fines," various sources emphasize in particular his refusal to
observe the principle of salvo contenemento. One writer has described, as an occasion on
which Judge Jeffreys "pervert[ed] the law," Jeffreys's conclusion that "the clause in
Magna Charta, 'Liber homo non amercietur pro magno delicto nisi salvo contenemento
suo,' does not apply to fines imposed by the King's Judges." 4 JOHN CAMPBELL, LIvES OF
THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 412 (1847)
(footnote omitted); see also, e.g., The Tryal of John Hambden, Esq., 9 STATE TRIALS
1054, 1124 (1684) (describing Justice Jeffreys's statement, when confronted with a
defendant's claim that "Magna Carta says, there should be a Salvo Contenemento in all
fines," that "[Magna Carta] was never meant of Fines for great Offenses" and Jeffreys's
subsequent decision to sentence the defendant without regard to ability to pay).
98. Granucci, supra note 16, at 858.
99. 10 STATE TRIALS 1325 (T. Howell ed. 1811).
100. See Granucci, supra note 16, at 858.
101. Id. at 859. As noted in A Complete Collection of State Trials and for High
Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors, "On the 2d of July, A bill was brought into
the House of Commons to reverse the two judgments against Oates, it was passed and
carried up to the Lords on the 6th." 10 STATE TRIALS 1079, 1329. Oates was released in
August 1689. See JANE LANE, TITUS OATES 328-29 (1949).
102. See, e.g., Granucci, supra note 16.
103. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
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relation to its failure to respect Magna Carta's economic-survival
principles:
4. Exception. Fined 1,000 marks in each judgment, and
committed in execution for the fines aforesaid; which
fines are excessive, twice as much as the Defendant
was worth, and therefore against Magna Charta, by
which all fines ought to be with a salvo contenimento.'m
Further illustration of this point may be found in a case in the
House of Lords-known as the Earl of Devonshire's Caseo'-which
follows Parliament's adoption of the English Bill of Rights by just
three months. Because of the proximity of this case to the passage of
the Bill of Rights, later commentators have regarded the House of
Lords' opinion in this matter as valuable in shedding light on the
meaning of the punishment clauses of the 1689 Bill of Rights; indeed,
the Supreme Court has cited this case for the proposition that the
English Bill of Rights incorporates a proportionality principle."
104. Dominus Rex v. Oates, reprinted in 1 THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF
LORDS, 1689-1690 81 (1889). For additional evidence suggesting that English excessive
fines protections contemplated ability to pay as an "excessiveness" referent, see Claus,
supra note 11, at 123. It appears likely that the English prohibition may also have
contemplated a broader criterion for "excessiveness," encompassing not just
"excessiveness" relative to ability to pay (or, for that matter, "excessiveness" in its
standard proportionality sense) but "excessiveness" relative to established precedent. See
id.; Stinneford, supra note 9. As Stinneford describes, id. at 936-37, the arguments before
Parliament in The Earl of Devonshire's Case, (1687) 11 STATE TRIALS 1353, provide
support for just such an understanding of "excessiveness." In that case, it was proposed
that, in determining excessiveness, "[tihere are two things which have heretofore been
looked upon as very good guides, 1st, what has formerly been expressly done in the like
case; 2dly, for want of such particular direction, then to consider that which comes the
nearest to it, and so proportionably to add or abate, as the manner and circumstance of the
case do require." Id. at 1362. Because the English precedent for calculating monetary
penalties was based in part on Magna Carta's dual principles of proportionality and
livelihood protection, both of these principles would have been encompassed by a
precedent-based conceptualization of excessiveness.
105. 11 STATE TRIALS 1353.
106. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983) (quoting language from this case);
see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1998) (same); Browning-Ferris
Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 291 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
376 (1910) (same). This basic intuition-that the word "excessive" in the Excessive Fines
Clause must denote an explicit proportionality principle-has been repeated by a number
of commentators. See, e.g., Cordray, supra note 2, at 458 n.244 ("[Tihe proportionality
guarantee is more explicit in the Excessive Fines Clause than in the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause."); Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the
Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 61, 113-14 (1993)
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While the 1689 excessive fines clause surely incorporates such a
principle-designed, as it was, to reassert Magna Carta's traditional
dual principles of proportionality and salvo contenementom-it is
somewhat questionable that this case actually stands for the
proposition (proportionality tout court) for which the Court has cited
it. In the Earl of Devonshire's Case, the House of Lords was of the
opinion that a "fine of thirty thousand pounds, imposed by the court
of King's Bench.. ., was excessive and exorbitant, against magna
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law of the
land.""a" In that case, however, the argument made by the Earl of
Devonshire to the House of Lords suggests that a core aspect of his
complaint was that the fine was excessive in relation to his personal
means to pay the fine. In making the case for the "excessiveness of
the fine," the historical experience with the Star Chamber and the
circumstances of its abolition were emphasized:
The Court of Starchamber was taken away, because of
the unmeasurable Fines which it impos'd, which alone
was a plain and direct prohibition for any other court
to do the like, for otherwise the Mischief remain'd ....
[T]hose great Fines, imposed in that Court, were
inconsistent with the Law of England, which is a Law
of Mercy, and concludes every Fine which is left at
discretion, with Salvo Contenimento."
Then, regarding the rationale for this rule, it is remarked:
("The Eighth Amendment includes an explicit proportionality requirement in its
prohibition of excessive fines.") (footnote omitted); Rachel A. Van Cleave, "Death Is
Different," Is Money Different? Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages-
Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 217, 274 (2003) ("[Tihe Excessive Fines Clause is arguably explicit in its inclusion of
proportionality review...."); Warren, supra note 38, at 1331 ("The Court has read 'cruel
and unusual punishments' as implicitly requiring what the Excessive Fines Clause requires
explicitly: proportionate or non-excessive punishment.").
107. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 231-38 (1999)
(discussing the traditional proportionality principle in English law).
108. Earl of Devonshire's Case, 11 STATE TRIALS 1367 (1689).
109. Id. at 1362.
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[I]f the judges may commit the party to prison till the
fine be paid, and withal set so great a fine as is
impossible for the party to pay into court, then it will
depend upon the judges pleasure, whether he shall
ever has his liberty; because the fine may be such as he
shall never be able to pay; and thus every man's liberty
is wrested out of the dispose of the law, and is stuck
under the girdle of the judges.o
A number of other examples also exist in which "excessiveness"
is conceptualized as incorporating reference to an offender's ability to
pay. For example, in reversing a fine entered against Samuel
Barnardiston, the House of Lords declared that a "Fine of Ten
Thousand Pounds is exorbitant and excessive, and not warranted by
legal Precedent in former Ages; for all Fines ought to be with a Salvo
Contenemento, and not to the Parties Ruin."" In light of this history,
it is unsurprising that, by the early eighteenth century, the principle of
salvo contenemento was being described as grounded on both the
Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights.12
Blackstone, in the fourth volume of his Commentaries (published
in 1769), provides an extensive discussion regarding the
"reasonableness of fines." He begins by noting that in the context of
"discretionary fines and discretionary length of imprisonment," the
"duration and quantity of each must frequently vary, from the
aggravations or otherwise of the offence, the quality and condition of
the parties, and from innumerable other circumstances.""' Blackstone
further notes that "[t]he reasonableness of fines in criminal cases has
also been usually regulated by the determination of Magna Carta
concerning amercements for misbehavior."" 4 Indeed, he suggests that
"the bill of rights was only declaratory of the old constitutional
law.""' Then, after quoting Chapter 14 of the Magna Carta in full, he
provides the following gloss on the principle of salvo contenemento:
110. Id. at 1363.
111. 14 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS: 1685-1691 210 (1767-1830), available at
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=13061.
112. See, e.g., R. v. Bennett, 93 Eng. Rep. 412, 413 (1712) (K.B.) ("The fine here will
be salvo contenemento, according to Magna Charta, and the Bill of Rights.").
113. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *371.
114. Id. at *372.
115. Id.
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A rule that obtained even in Henry the Second's time,
and means only that no man shall have a larger
amercement imposed upon him than his circumstances
or personal estate will bear: saving to the landholder
his contenement, or land: to the trader his
merchandise; and to the countryman his wainage, or
team and instruments of husbandry.
[I]t is never usual to assess a larger fine than a man is
able to pay, without touching the implements of his
livelihood, but to inflict corporal punishment, or a
stated imprisonment, which is better than an excessive
fine, for that amounts to imprisonment for life.116
Similarly, Matthew Bacon writes that "amercements are to be
with a salvo contenemento, and were always holden too grievous and
excessive, if they deprived the offender of the means of his
livelihood."'"1 Other eighteenth century sources similarly affirm the
centrality of the principle of salvo contenemento to the proper
calculation of monetary penalties."' Writing in 1771, William Eden
outlined this principle in his influential treatise, Principles of Penal
Law."9 After noting that "the bill of rights was only declaratory of
the old constitutional privileges," he writes that "[i]t is the usage of
the courts, superinduced on the clause of Magna Charta relative to
civil amercements, never to extend the fine of any criminal so far, as
116. Id. at *372-73.
117. 3 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 186 (1798).
118. 2 NEW ABRIDGMENT OF LAW, BY A GENTLEMAN OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE 517
(1736); 5 id. at 247 ("[I]n a criminal Case a Man is by Magna Charta to be fined with a
Salvo Contenemento suo, and consequently no greater Fine is to be imposed than he is
able to pay. . .. "); see also, e.g., Edwards v. Hughs, 25 Eng. Rep. 146, 147-48 (1726)
(noting that "before th[e] Charter of Liberties [i.e., Magna Carta] the Lords used to set
such excessive and grievous Amerciaments on their Tenants, that under Pretence of such
amerciaments, they used to seize the whole Profit of the Tenement which they had
granted" and that, under the Magna Carta, amerciaments "must not destroy the
Livelihood of the Offender").
119. WILLIAM EDEN, BARON AUCKLAND, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 64 (2d
ed.1771). As the Supreme Court has noted (in the context of relying on Auckland's work
to elucidate the meaning of the Fifth Amendment), this widely-read treatise "passed
through three editions in England and at least one in Ireland within six years before the
Declaration of Independence." Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422 (1885).
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to take from him the implements, and means of his profession, and
livelihood; or to deprive his family of their necessary support."
Instead, "[i]f the produce of his property, under those humane
restrictions, be thought inadequate to the degree of the offense, some
corporal punishment is inflicted, or stated imprisonment." 20
Consequently, he suggests, "the wisdom of our Law, having thus
amply secured the property, and personal freedom of the subject,
hath rarely thought it advisable to affix certain sums to specified
crimes. 121 As late as 1844, a leading jurist would suggest that "Magna
Charta provides that no fine shall be imposed beyond what the party
is able to pay."1 22
As the discussion presented in Blackstone's Commentaries
suggests, the dual principles of proportionality and salvo
contenemento reinforced each other. Because a collateral
consequence of imposing a fine that could not be paid was indefinite
imprisonment (irrespective of the characteristics of the offense in
question), such a punishment would make a mockery of notions of
proportional punishment. This point was recognized by the
eighteenth century jurist Sollom Emlyn, who observed:
If no Measures were to be observed in [regulating the
imposition of] discretionary Punishments, a Man who
is guilty of a Misdemeanor might be in a worse
Condition than if he had committed a capital Crime;
he might be exposed to an indefinite and perpetual
Imprisonment, a punishment not at all favour'd by
law, as being worse than Death itself: nor does an
extravagant Fine, which is beyond the Power of the
Offender ever to pay or raise, differ much from it; for
if his Imprisonment depend upon a Condition, which
120. EDEN, supra note 119, at 64-65.
121. Id. at 65.
122. O'Connell v. Reg., 11 Cl. & Fin. 59, 406 (1844) (Campell, L.) (U.K. H.L.). Even
today, a somewhat analogous requirement is codified in the U.K.'s Criminal Justice Act of
2003, 2003 c. 44, section 164 of which requires that "[bjefore fixing the amount of any fine
to be imposed on an offender who is an individual, a court must inquire into his financial
circumstances." Id. The Act further provides (1) that "[t]he amount of any fine fixed by a
court must be such as, in the opinion of the court, reflects the seriousness of the offence"
and (2) that "[i]n fixing the amount of any fine to be imposed on an offender..., a court
must take into account the circumstances of the case including, among other things, the
financial circumstances of the offender...." Id.
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will never be in his power to perform, it is the same as
if it were absolute and unconditional .... .
Thus, while "every case must depend upon its own particular
circumstances," "some Fines and some Punishments are so
monstrously extravagant, that no body can doubt their being so."l24
Reflecting these principles, there is evidence that criminal fining
practices in English courts following the adoption of the 1689 Bill of
Rights did indeed take poverty into account when setting the level of
criminal fines: One leading study of fining practices in and around
London at the turn of the seventeenth century concludes that
"following the conventional practice of adjusting fines to the
defendant's ability to pay, the justices were willing to reduce fines for
poor defendants"'25 and that "the defendant's ability to pay played a
role in determining the size of the fine: 61% of gentlemen, compared
to only 44% of all other men, were fined more than 3s. 4d."' 26
III. Salvo Contenemento and the Meaning of Excessive Fines
Protections in Early American History
A. Colonial Era
Early colonists in America claimed "the same fundamental rights
as other Englishmen." ,1 Among these rights were the Magna Carta's
123. 1 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS, AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH-
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS; FROM THE REIGN OF KING
RICHARD II TO THE REIGN OF KING GEORGE II xii (S. Emlyn ed., 3d ed. 1742) (footnotes
omitted).
124. Id. (citing, as examples of excessive fines, John Hampden's Case, 9 STATE
TRIALS 1054, 1126 (1684); and Trial of Sir Samuel Barnardiston, 9 STATE TRIALS 1333
(1684)). Emlyn also emphasized the importance of proportionality, noting that "A Judge
therefore ought to be strictly careful that he conform to the rules of law not only as to the
nature of the Punishment, but likewise as to the degrees thereof." Id.
125. ROBERT B. SHOEMAKER, PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT: PETTY CRIME AND
THE LAW IN LONDON AND RURAL MIDDLESEX, C. 1660-1725 155-61 (1991).
126. Id.
127. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3064 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring); see
also id. at 3065 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Md. Act for the Liberties of the
People (1639), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 68; citing Charter of Va. (1606),
reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3783, 3788 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909); Charter of New England (1620),
reprinted in 3 id., at 1827, 1839; Charter of Mass. Bay (1629), reprinted in id. at 1846, 1856-
57; Grant of the Province of Me. (1639), reprinted in id., at 1625, 1635; Charter of Carolina
(1663), reprinted in 5 id., at 2743, 2747; Charter of R.I. and Providence Plantations (1663),
reprinted in 6 id., at 3211, 3220; Charter of Ga. (1732), reprinted in 2 id., at 765, 773))
(concluding that "[a]s English subjects, the colonists considered themselves to be vested
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prohibitions on excessive amercements, including both its
proportionality principle and the limiting principle of salvo
contenemento. In fact, in the years prior to Parliament's adoption of
the English Bill of Rights in 1689, allusions to the concept of salvo
contenemento are attested in a number of documents relating to
colonial era understandings of the scope of fundamental rights. For
example, William Penn's Frame of the Colony of Pennsylvania of
1682 provided "[t]hat all fines shall be moderate, and saving men's
contenements, merchandize, or wainage."'" The New York Charter
of Liberties and Privileges of 1683 mirrored Chapter 14 of the Magna
Carta even more closely, providing "[tlhat a freeman shall not be
amerced for a small fault but after the manner of his fault and for a
great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him his freehold and
a husbandman saving to him his wainage, and a merchant saving to
him his merchandise."" 9 In Maryland's Protestant Revolution of
1689, when disaffected colonists led by John Coode rebelled against
the colonial government, one stated justification for their actions was
the "[t]he Imposseinge Exessive fines Contrary to magna Charta
without any respect had to the salvo Contenemento suo sibi therein
Injoyned.""o A generation later, in 1721, Jeremiah Dummer's
seminal work A Defence of the New-England Charters similarly
with the same fundamental rights as other Englishmen" and citing a number of colonial
laws claiming traditional English rights and liberties); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 286 (1983) (citing 1 J. CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 83 (Ford ed. 1904) (Address to the
People of Great Britain, Oct. 21, 1774) (declaring that "we claim all the benefits secured to
the subject by the English constitution"); 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES 700 (4th series 1837)
(Georgia Resolutions, Aug. 10, 1774) ("[His Majesty's subjects in America... are
entitled to the same rights, privileges, and immunities with their fellow-subjects in Great
Britain.. .. "); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967 (1991) ("[Nlot only is the original
meaning of the [English] 1689 Declaration of Rights relevant, but also the circumstances
of its enactment, insofar as they display the particular "rights of English subjects" it was
designed to vindicate.").
128. Pennsylvania Frame of Government § XVIII, reprinted in 1 THE ROOTS OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 141 (B. Schwartz ed. 1971). This principle was reaffirmed in 1700, when
the Pennsylvania legislature required "[t]hat all fines shall be moderate, saving men's
contenements, merchandise and wainage, which is to say, their furniture of their calling
and means of livelihood." An Act To Prevent Immoderate Fines, reprinted in 2 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 TO 1801 44 (1896).
129. Charter of Liberties and Privileges, Oct. 30, 1683, reprinted in 1 AMERICA'S
FOUNDING CHARTERS 177, 178 (Jon L. Wakelyn ed. 2006).
130. See "Mariland's Grevances Wiy The Have Taken Op Arms" (Beverly McAnear
ed.), reprinted in 8 J. S. HIST. 392. 401 (1942). For an extensive history of this rebellion,
see LOIS GREEN CARR & DAVID WILLIAM JORDAN, MARYLAND'S REVOLUTION OF
GOVERNMENT 1689-1692 (1974); see also FRANCIS EDGAR SPARKS, CAUSES OF THE
MARYLAND REVOLUTION OF 1689 (1896).
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demonstrated a keen familiarity with the dual proportionality and
economic-survival protections of the Magna Carta. Dummer, a
Massachusetts native serving as agent for the New England colonies
in London, proclaimed that "[t]he Subjects Abroad claim the
Privilege of Magna Charta, which says that no Man shall be fin'd
above the Nature of his Offense and, whatever his Miscarriage be, a
Salvo Contenemento suo is to be observ'd by the Judge."" And
indeed, there is some evidence that colonial courts did, in practice,
tend to take into account the individual characteristics of defendants
when determining the level of fines. 3 2
131. JEREMIAH DUMMER, A DEFENCE OF THE NEW-ENGLAND CHARTERS 16-17
(1721). On Dummer and his important role in early American political thought, see
CRAIG YIRUSH, SETTLERS, LIBERTY, AND EMPIRE: THE ROOTS OF EARLY AMERICAN
POLITICAL THEORY, 1675-1775 83-112 (2011).
While seventeenth and early eighteenth century colonists may have been clear on their
entitlement to the rights of English subjects (including explicit claims to the Magna Carta's
principle of salvo contenemento), officials back in Great Britain were-perhaps
unsurprisingly-less certain on this point. The archives of the British colonial office
record a letter dated February 27, 1707, in which the Council of Trade and Plantations
requests an opinion of the Attorney General on the matter of whether the authorities of
the Massachusetts Bay Colony possessed the power to impose fines for misdemeanors
and, "[s]upposing that a power is granted them by the Charter, whether [it is] unlimited
and arbitrary without a salvo contenemento, or whether the fine to be imposed is to be
moderated and restrained to the condition, circumstances and abilities of the persons
offending." Letter of Attorney General to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Feb. 27,
1707, reprinted in CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND
WEST INDIES, 1706-1708 § 787, at 386 (Cecil Headlam ed. 1916). Despite the concern
expressed in the letter that if the fine is "more than he is worth ... if he should be detained
in prison till he has paid his fine, he must lose his liberty during life," id., the colonial
archives record a reply made on March 28 of that year, in which the Attorney General
concluded that the courts of the Massachusetts colony "might legally impose a fine on a
man without a salvo contenemento, otherwise a poor man is not to be fined at all." Letter
of Attorney General to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Mar. 28, 1707, reprinted in
id. § 832, at 410.
132. See, e.g., Kathryn Preyer, Penal Measures in the American Colonies: An
Overview, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 326, 350 (1982) ("[Wlithin the discretion of the
judge,... the precise amount of the fine was established by him and tailored individually
to the particular case. The range was apparently without limit except insofar as it was
within the expectation on the part of the court that it would be paid.") (emphasis added);
Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings About Apprendi, 82
N.C. L. REV. 621, 640-41 (2004) ("As in England, the two main forms of noncapital
punishment were whippings and fines, and, in both cases, the judge could set the amount
or even elect between the two, depending upon the nature of the defendant and the
crime."); Chilton L. Powell, Marriage in Early New England, 1 NEW ENGLAND Q. 333
n.23 (1928) (noting that in the context of colonial era fines for fornication, "fines ranging
from £2 to £10 were levied, the amount apparently depending upon the culprits ability to
pay rather than upon the circumstances of the case"); but see FORREST MCDONALD,
Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 21
(1985) (suggesting that "during the eighteenth century, fines that amounted to total
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Colonial-era understandings regarding the nature of these
limitations on the scope of judicial discretion to fine defendants
would likely have been influenced by the writings of Edward Coke
and William Blackstone-two English writers who had a profound
effect on the development of early American legal and political
thought."' Blackstone's Commentaries, as noted above, explicitly ties
the issue of what constitutes an "excessive fine" to Magna Carta's
regulation of amercements under the twin principles of
proportionality and salvo contenemento.m
Also perhaps influential may have been the work of the Italian
jurist Cesare Beccaria, whose 1764 treatise On Crimes and
Punishments highlights both the importance of proportionality in
systems of criminal justice, and the risks of excessive reliance on
monetary sanctions;"' as Beccaria notes, "fines only increase the
number of criminals above the original number of crimes, and take
bread from the innocent when taking it from the villains.""'
forfeiture was exacted of felons in all the American colonies, despite articles against
excessive fines in Magna Carta, in the statute of 1 Westminster, c. 30, and in the 1689
English Bill of Rights").
133. For Coke's treatment of the principle of salvo contenemento, see COKE, supra
note 75, at 27-29; for Blackstone's, see 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *372-73. On
Coke's influence on American legal development, see H. TREVOR COLBOURN, THE LAMP
OF EXPERIENCE: WHIG HISTORY AND THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1965); Charles F. Mullett, Coke and the American Revolution, 38
ECONOMICA 457 (1932). On Blackstone's influence, see WILFRID PREST, WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE: LAW AND LETTERS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (2008); CHARLES F.
MULLETT, FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1760-1776 (1966);
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (1941); Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the
New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731 (1976).
134. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
135. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS
(Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies trans., 1995). On the influence of Beccaria's work,
see Bessler, supra note 9, at 47-65 (discussing and citing sources). See also, e.g., John D.
Bessfer, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court's Death Penalty Jurisprudence,
49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913, 1934 n.156 (2013) ("In a 1786 letter written in Philadelphia by
James Madison's friend, William Bradford, Jr., to Luigi Castiglioni, an Italian botanist
who visited America in the 1780s, Bradford wrote this of Beccaria's treatise: 'One must
attribute mainly to this excellent book the honor of this revolution in our penal code. The
name of Beccaria has become familiar in Pennsylvania, his authority has become great,
and his principles have spread among all classes of persons and impressed themselves
deeply in the hearts of our citizens."') (quoting LUIGI CASTIGLIONI'S VIAGGIO: TRAVELS
IN THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA, 1785-87 313-14 (Antonio Pace ed. & trans.
1983).
136. BECCARIA, supra note 135, at 53.
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More broadly, it is perhaps instructive that at least one
prominent member of the Founding generation understood private
property as falling into two basic types: that which was necessary for
economic survival (and thus protected as a matter of natural right)
and that which was not. As Benjamin Franklin wrote in 1783:
All the Property that is necessary to a Man, for the
Conservation of the Individual and the Propagation of
the Species, is his natural Right, which none can justly
deprive him of: But all Property superfluous to such
purposes is the Property of the Publick, who, by their
Laws, have created it, and who may therefore by other
Laws dispose of it, whenever the Welfare of the
Publick shall demand such Disposition."'
Finally, the case of Virginia is particularly informative. Because
Virginia's 1776 Declaration of Rights"" served as the immediate
template for the Eighth Amendment,'" exploring the fining practices
of the Virginia courts enables us to explore contemporary
understandings as to the meaning of that provision. At the time of
the First Congress, the imposition of fines in Virginia was governed
by a 1786 statute.'40 This law-described by the Chief Justice of the
Virginia Supreme Court in a 1799 opinion as having been "founded
upon the spirit" of the state's constitutional excessive fines
protection"'-required, in relevant part, that "in every...
137. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Robert Morris (Dec. 25, 1783), in BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN: WRITINGS 1079, 1082 (Library of America 1987); see generally Jerry L.
Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward a "Broader Vision" of Property Rights, 37
U. KAN. L. REv. 529, 533 (1989) ("For Franklin and other republicans, protecting a
certain amount of private property was necessary to provide for basic human needs and to
encourage socially useful production."); Gerald Stourzh, Reason and Power in Benjamin
Franklin's Political Thought, 47 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1092 (1953). One might think of
Franklin's proposed typology of property interests as something of a forerunner of Radin's
conception of "fungible" and "personal" as two property archetypes-albeit one with a far
more cramped understanding of "personhood" (i.e., only property necessary for a person's
basic survival). See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957
(1982).
138. Va. Declaration of Rights § 9 (1776), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at
235 (1971).
139. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
140. An Act for Preventing Vexations and Malicious Prosecutions, and Moderating
Amercements, reprinted in ACTS PASSED AT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 41, 41-42 (1786).
141. Jones v. Com., 5 Va. (1 Call) 555, 556-57 (1799) (Roane, J.).
869
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
information or indictment, the amercement. . . ought to be according
to the degree of the fault, and saving to the offender his
contenement."'42 In other words, to realize the "spirit" of the Virginia
Bill of Rights' prohibition against "excessive fines," the legislature
provided that fines must be set with reference both to the "degree of
the fault" and to the "estate of the offender.""'
B. Early Republic
Essentially no Supreme Court Excessive Fines Clause case law
exists prior to the modern era. Nevertheless, there is some evidence
attesting to the conceptualization of the Excessive Fines Clause as
prohibiting fines that grossly exceeded a defendant's ability to pay.
For example, in the 1846 case of Spalding v. New York,'" one
litigant-a bankrupt facing a large criminal fine-argued that "the
imposition of this fine... was excessive, and was a cruel punishment
for the offence, for it imposed an impossibility" and "[t]he law never
imposes a fine, where it presumes the party can have nothing to
pay."'4 Likewise, in Ex Parte Watkins,146 an opinion for the Court by
Justice Story in 1833 noted the argument made by one petitioner
"[t]hat the fines imposed upon him are excessive, and contrary to the
eighth amendment of the constitution; which declares, that excessive
fines shall not be enforced."147 In both cases, however, the matter was
142. Supra note 140 (emphasis added).
143. Jones, 5 Va. (1 Call) at 556-57 (discussing "the clause of the bill of rights
prohibiting excessive fines and the act of 1786 founded on the spirit of it and providing,
that the fine should be according to the degree of the fault and the estate of the
offender"). Judge Roane's glossing of the statutory provision "saving to the offender his
contenement" as requiring that a fine "be according to... the estate of the offender" is
instructive as to contemporary understandings of the meaning of the word "contenement,"
as is his apparent use of the terms "fine" and "amercements" interchangeably.
Judge Roane goes on to note that the imposition of the contemplated fine would be "so
unjust and contrary to the spirit of the constitution, that even if it were established by
adjudged cases to be the law, nay even if an act of Assembly should pass authorizing it, in
express terms, I should most probably be of opinion that the one should be exploded and
the other declared unconstitutional and not law." Id. at 557 (Roane, J.); see generally
William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REv. 455, 494-95
(2005) (discussing Virginia's well-established pre-Marbury tradition of judicial review).
144. 45 U.S. 21 (1846).
145. Spalding, 45 U.S. at 30, quoted in Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment
Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 567, 581 n.76 (2010).
146. 32 U.S. 568 (1833).
147. Id. at 573.
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disposed of on other grounds, and the courts did not reach the
constitutional issue.'48
Moreover, while the evidence from the federal courts in the
Early Republic may be limited, a number of early opinions in the
state courts attest to judicial understandings of excessive fines
protections as incorporating a consideration of an individual's ability
to pay. For example, in Commonwealth v. Morrison,49 an 1819 case
in the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the court was called upon to
articulate the test for determining the constitutional "excessiveness"
of fines under the state constitution. After noting that "no definite
criterion is furnished by the constitution or bill of rights by which to
ascertain what fine would or would not be excessive," the court
concluded "[tihe fine imposed should bear a just proportion to the
offense committed" as well as to "the situation, circumstances and
character of the offender."'" The North Carolina Supreme Court, in
148. Writing for the Court in Ex Parte Watkins, Justice Story concluded that no
appellate jurisdiction existed through which the Supreme Court might modify the lower
court's sentence, id. at 574, and, in dicta, further suggested "there is nothing on the record
in this case, which establishes that at the time of passing judgment the present fines were,
in fact, or were shown to the circuit court to be, excessive." Id.
It is unclear whether Justice Story's statement should be taken as expressing skepticism of
the very notion of an inability to pay-based Excessive Fines Clause challenge, or whether
the statement should be taken as merely suggesting that Watkins had not successfully
demonstrated the excessiveness of the fine in relation to his own circumstances in the case
at bar. If, however, Justice Story had regarded the Excessive Fines Clause inquiry as
consisting solely of a comparison between penalty and offense, it is unclear why "the time
of passing judgment," id., would have been a relevant factor to consider in the
excessiveness calculus at all. In contrast, if Justice Story's opinion instead contemplated a
notion of excessiveness as encompassing fines that were beyond an individual's ability to
pay, the use of such a baseline would have made perfect sense.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Ex Parte Watkins, a similar Excessive Fines
Clause argument was made again by Watkins in the Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia. See United States v. Watkins, 4 D.C. (4 Cranch) 490 (1833). There, Chief Judge
Cranch noted counsel's argument "[t]hat the fines were excessive, and amount to a
sentence of perpetual imprisonment." Id. at 492. Again, however, the court resolved the
case on other grounds and did not reach the issue. Id. at 498.
149. 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 75, 99 (1819).
150. Id. Similarly, in determining whether "excessive damages" had been assessed in
the tort context, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in Applegate v. Ruble, 9 Ky. (2 A.K.
Marsh) 128, 130 (1819), adopted as an appropriate "excessiveness" reference the size of
the defendant's estate: when the defendant moved to set aside a verdict on the grounds of
"[e]xcessiveness of damages," the court concluded "one-tenth of defendant's estate are not
damages so excessive as to warrant a new trial on that account alone." Id. at 129, 130
(emphasis added); accord Potter v. Lansing, 1 Johns. 215 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806) (suggesting
damages were not "excessive" because the jury "were the proper judges of [the
defendant's] circumstances, and if they thought him able to pay, the sum they have given is
not extravagant") (emphasis added). Although these examples are from the private law
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the 1838 case of State v. Manuel,"' similarly concluded that "[w]hether
a fine be reasonable or excessive, ought to depend on the nature of
the offence, and the ability of the offender."'52 Reflecting such
understandings, early treatises emphasized the importance of
tethering the level of fines to the individual ability for payment. For
example, Benjamin Lynde Oliver's 1832 work The Rights of an
American Citizen states that in light of the Excessive Fines Clause, "it
is forbidden to impose unreasonable fines, on account of the difficulty
the person fined would have of paying them, the default of which
would be punished by imprisonment only." 53
IV. The Excessive Fines Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment
The history presented in the prior sections provides insight
regarding the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, at least as it was
understood to apply against the federal government in 1791. But what
of the Clause as applied against the states?
A. Current Incorporation Status
As one recent district court opinion notes, "[tihere is a surprising
amount of confusion as to whether the Excessive Fines Clause has
been incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."'" The Supreme Court's
pronouncements on this issue have been, to put it mildly, in tension
with one other. In McDonald v. City of Chicago,"' the Court
context, they nevertheless provide an illustration of contemporary understandings of
meaning of the term "excessiveness" as applied in the judicial context.
151. 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 20 (1838).
152. Id. at 35 (emphasis added). Highlighting the multifaceted nature of the
"excessiveness" inquiry, other state cases in the early nineteenth century appear to
characterize "excessiveness" along the dimension of proportionality between fine and
offense. See, e.g., Steptoe v. Auditor, 24 Va. (3. Rand.) 221, 233-34 (1825) (characterizing
a fine as "excessive, as bearing no proportion whatever to the nature of the offence")
(emphasis in original); Bullock v. Goodall, 7 Va. (3 Call) 44, 49-50 (1801) ("No man can
doubt, but that a fine of 264. 8s. 9d. imposed on an officer who has committed no fault, for
the benefit of a creditor who has sustained no injury, is superlatively excessive,
unconstitutional, oppressive, and against conscience.").
153. BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 185 (1832).
154. Reyes v. N. Texas Tollway Auth., 830 F. Supp. 2d 194, 206 (N.D. Tex. 2011); see
also, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 899 n.69 (2011) ("It is disputed
whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment has been incorporated.").
155. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
872 [Vol. 40:4
Summer 2013] EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE ORIGINAL MEANING
suggested that "[w]e never have decided whether the Third
Amendment or the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessive
fines applies to the States through the Due Process Clause.""' In a
2001 case, in contrast, the Court stated that the Due Process Clause
"makes the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines
and cruel and unusual punishments applicable to the States.""7 And
at various other points, the Court has similarly appeared to suggest
that the entire Eighth Amendment is incorporated."' The Court
expressly refrained from deciding the incorporation issue in the 1989
case of Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal,"
over the protests of Justice O'Connor. In her opinion, Justice
O'Connor suggested that she saw, in light of the Court's clear
incorporation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause'6 and its
assumed incorporation of the Excessive Bail Clause,6' "no reason to
distinguish one Clause of the Eighth Amendment from another for
purposes of incorporation, and would hold that the Excessive Fines
Clause also applies to the States."'62
Against this backdrop, as one authority notes, "[t]he lower court
responses to these differing signals from the Supreme Court has been
mixed."' 63 Although case law in certain lower courts-including the
156. Id. at 3035, n.13.
157. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433-34 (2001).
One lower court, however, has suggested that this statement may be "more wishful
thinking than a statement of the law." Reyes, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
158. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) ("The Eighth
Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that
'[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."'); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 560 (2005) ("The Eighth Amendment provides 'Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.' The
provision is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."). One author
has gone so far as to criticize such characterizations as "judicial sloppiness rather than an
accurate statement of the law" in light of statements to the contrary in Browning-Ferris
and McDonald. Samuel Wiseman, McDonald's Other Right, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 23,
24 n.4 (2011).
159. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22
(stating that "we shall not decide whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
excessive fines applies to the several States through the Fourteenth Amendment, nor shall
we decide whether the Eighth Amendment protects corporations as well as individuals").
160. Id. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962)).
161. Id. (citing Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971)).
162. Id.
163. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, at § 2.6(b) (3d ed., 2012);
see QWest Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 427 F.3d 1061, 1069-70 (8th Cir. 2005)
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Fifth and Eighth Circuits'"-has been viewed as having held that the
Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated outright, other courts have
simply assumed without deciding that the Clause is incorporated,'
while still others have expressly held that the Excessive Fines Clause
is not incorporated.'"
Scholarly opinion is also somewhat split. One leading treatise
has concluded that "the Court never has ruled as to whether the
prohibition of excessive fines in the Eighth Amendment is
incorporated."'6 ' Another suggests that although "[t]he Court has not
determined whether the 'excessive fine' provision of the Eighth
Amendment is applicable to the states," "the provision seems
logically intertwined with the other provisions of that Amendment,"
and thus "it may already have been impliedly made applicable to the
states." "
(applying the Excessive Fines Clause against state government); Ex parte Dorough, 773
So, 2d 1001, 1004 (Ala. 2000) (same); In the Matter of Property Seized From Terrel, 639
N.W.2d 18, 20-22 (Iowa 2002) (same); State v. A House and 1.37 Acres of Real Prop., 886
P.2d 534, 539-40 (Utah 1994) (same); Enquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agric., 478 F.3d 985,
1005-07 (9th Cir. 2007) (assuming arguendo the incorporation of the Excessive Fines
Clause); City of Milwaukee v. Arrieh, 211 Wis. 2d 764, 771-76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)
(same); Pueblo School Dist. No. 70 v. Toth, 924 P.2d 1094, 1099-100 (Colo. App. 1996)
(same); State v. Meister, 866 S.W.2d 485, 488-491 (Mo. App. W.D. (1993) (same); Taylor
v. Cisneros, 913 F. Supp. 314, 323 (D.N.J. (1995) (same).
164. See, e.g., Watson v. Johnson Mobile Homes, 284 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 2002)
("The imposition of punitive damages under state law is constrained by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the first proscribing excessive fines and cruel and unusual
punishment, the second making grossly excessive punishments unlawful under its Due
Process Clause."); Qwest, 427 F.3d at 1069 ("The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
excessive fines applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
165. See, e.g., Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 914-19 (9th Cir. 2000) (assuming
without deciding that the Excessive Fines Clause applied against a Washington State
government entity); State v. Goodenow, 251 Or. App. 139, 147 n.7 (Or. Ct. App. 2012)
("[W]e assume, without deciding, that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also, e.g.,
State v. Clark, 124 Wash. 2d 90, 102 (Wash. 1994) ("Because neither party raises it, we do
not reach the issue whether the federal excessive fines clause applies to state action....
Even if we were to assume the federal excessive fines clause does apply to state action, the
Clarks' challenge would fail because they have not established that either of the
forfeitures is 'excessive' under the federal constitution.").
166. See, e.g., Reyes, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 208 ("[T]his court concludes that the Excessive
Fines Clause is not incorporated against the states . . . .").
167. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 505
(3rd ed. 2006).
168. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 14.2(a) (5th ed. 2011). For still more debate on
this topic see, for example, Eugene Volokh, Is the Excessive Fines Clause Incorporated
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B. The Excessive Fines Clause and the Reconstruction Era
In light of the uncertainty discussed in the prior section, there are
two important issues to consider. First, the gateway question:
Assuming arguendo that the federal Excessive Fines Clause has not
to date been incorporated against the states, should it be? And
second, if we accept that the Excessive Fines Clause should be
incorporated, how should the Clause-as applied against the states-
be interpreted? I consider these two questions in turn.
1. Incorporation
As noted above, it remains somewhat unclear whether the
Supreme Court has in fact incorporated the Excessive Fines Clause to
date."9  Given the traditional understanding of protection from
"excessive fines" as inherent in English fundamental law, and in light
of the fact that protections against excessive fines are among the most
ancient rights of the Anglo-American legal tradition, it can scarcely
be argued that such rights are not "'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.""' Moreover, as, a textual matter, as Justice
O'Connor implied in her Browning-Ferris dissent,"' it would seem
highly incongruous to conclude that the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause was not incorporated, while its parallel
provisions governing cruel and unusual punishments and excessive
bail were."'
Against the States?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (Aug. 30, 2010, 7:40 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2010/08/30/is-the-excessive-fines-clause-incorporated-against-the-
states.
169. See supra notes 154 through 168 and accompanying text.
170. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997)). Cf Amar, supra note 23, at 1248 ("Clearly an institution as venerable and
widespread as the grand jury, with roots in the mythic 'ancient constitution' of England
and in force in 1866 in all but a handful of states, could be plausibly claimed to be implicit
in ordered liberty.").
171. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
172. See Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights After McDonald v.
Chicago, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 159, 198 (2012) ("If it is accepted that the excessive
bail and the cruel and unusual prohibitions were incorporated properly against the states,
however, there is no textual reason that the excessive fines prohibition also should not
have been incorporated against the states. Indeed the English Bill of Rights included the
same language regarding excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment
that the Framers adopted in the Eighth Amendment, and at the time of the Constitution's
framing, similar provisions appeared in some of the states' constitutions.") (footnotes
omitted).
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Understanding the prohibition against excessive fines as a
fundamental right,"' properly incorporated against the states, finds
further support in the inclusion of analogous provisions in the large
majority of state constitutions. By 1791, excessive fines prohibitions
could be found in the constitutions of Delaware, Georgia, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia."' An analogous provision was also included in the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which established that "[a]ll fines shall
be moderate.""' By the end of 1868, explicit prohibitions on
"excessive fines" existed in thirty-five of thirty-seven state
Of course, a similar logic might also militate in favor of the incorporation of the Grand
Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as Amar and others have recognized. See AMAR,
supra note 97, at 197-202, 307 (characterizing the "failure to incorporate the right to .. . the
grand jury" as "hard to justify"); but see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 166 n.* (2012)
(suggesting that the fact that Grand Jury Clause "has not been mirrored by most state
constitutions" and that "it has the weakest foundations in actual modern practice at the
state level" may militate against incorporation); see generally Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 532-34 (1884) (declining to incorporate the grand jury right).
173. Or, alternatively, a "privilege or immunity" within the meaning of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF
FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 146-48 (1997); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18-25 (1980); MICHAEL
KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour
Come Round at Last?", 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405 (1972); Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1241 (1998); but see, e.g.,
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030-31 (noting that "[flor many decades, the question of the
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state infringement has been
analyzed under the Due Process Clause of that Amendment and not under the Privileges
or Immunities Clause" and "therefore declin[ing] to disturb the Slaughter-House holding"
to that effect). Engagement with the broader controversy over Due Process incorporation
versus Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporation is beyond the scope of this Article.
The case for the incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause is, however, a very strong
one irrespective of which framework is applied.
174. See DEL. Decl. of Rts. of 1776, § 16, reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at
278; GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LIX, reprinted in 1 id. at 300; MD. Decl. of Rts. of 1776, §
XXII, reprinted in 1 id. at 282; MASS. Decl. of Rts. of 1780, § XXVI, reprinted in 1 id. at
343; N.H. Bill of Rts. of 1783 § XXXIII, reprinted in 1 id. at 379; N.C. Decl. of Rts. of 1776,
§ X, reprinted in 1 id. at 287; PA. Decl. of Rts. of 1776, § 29, reprinted in 1 id. at 272; VA.
Decl. of Rts. of 1776, § 9, reprinted in 1 id. at 235.
175. Northwest Ordinance of 1787 § 3, reprinted in 1 United States Code, at LV-LVI
(2006); see also Matthew J. Hegreness, Note, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and Immunities,
120 YALE L.J. 1820, 1881 (2011) (suggesting the inclusion of this provision in the
Northwest Ordinance militates in favor of the incorporation of the Excessive Fines
Clause) (citations omitted).
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constitutions;"' today, "excessive fines" provisions are in forty-seven
such documents."'7
176. See ALA. CONST. of 1867 art. I, § 17, reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 127, at
134; ARK. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 7, reprinted in 1 id. at 307; CAL. CONST. of 1849 art. I, §
6, reprinted in 1 id. at 391; CONN. CONST. of 1818 art. I, § 13, reprinted in 1 id. at 538; DEL.
CONST. of 1831 art. I, § 11, reprinted in 1 id. at 583; FLA. CONST. of 1868 (Feb. 25, 1868)
art. I § 7, reprinted in 2 id. at 705; GA. CONST. of 1868 (Mar. 11, 1868) art I § 16, reprinted
in 2 id. at 823; IND. CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 16, reprinted in 2 id. at 1075; IOWA CONST. of
1857 art. I, § 17, reprinted in 2 id. at 1137; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rts. § 9, reprinted in 2 id. at
1242; KY. CONST. of 1850 art. XIII, § 17, reprinted in 3 id. at 1313; LA. CONST. of 1868 tit.
I, § 8, reprinted in 3 id. at 1449; ME. CONST. of 1819 art. I, § 9, reprinted in 3 id. at 1648;
MD. CONST. Decl. of Rts. art. 25, reprinted in 3 id. at 1781; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVI,
reprinted in 3 id. at 1892; MICH. CONST. of 1850 art. VI, § 31, reprinted in 4 id. at 1956;
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5, reprinted in 4 id. at 1992; MISS. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 8,
reprinted in 4 id. at 2069; MO. CONST. of 1865 art. 1, § 21, reprinted in 4 id. at 2191; NEB.
CONST. of 1866 art. I, §6, reprinted in 4 id. at 2349; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 6, reprinted in 4
id. at 2403; N.H. CONST. of 1784 pt. 1, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 4 id. at 2457; N.J. CONST.
of 1844 art. I, 15, reprinted in 5 id. at 2600; N.Y. CONST. of 1846 art. I, § 5, reprinted in 5
id. at 2654; N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 14, reprinted in 5 id. at 2800, 2801; OHIO CONST.
of 1851 art. I, § 9, reprinted in 5 id., at 2913, 2914; OR. CONST. art. I, § 16, reprinted in 5 id.
at 2999; PA. CONST. of 1838 art. I, § 13, reprinted in 5 id. at 3114; R.I. CONST. of 1842 art. I,
§ 8, reprinted in 6 id. at 3223; S.C. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 38, reprinted in 6 id. at 3284;
TENN. CONST. of 1834 art. I, § 16, reprinted in 6 id. at 3427; TEX. CONST. of 1868 art. I, §
11, reprinted in 6 id. at 3592; VA. CONST. of 1864 art. I, reprinted in 7 id. at 3854
(incorporating by reference the 1776 Bill of Rights); W. VA. CONST. of 1861 art. II, § 2,
reprinted in 7 id. at 4014; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 6, reprinted in 7 id. at 4077; cf ILL. CONST.
of 1848, art. XIII § 14, reprinted in 2 id. at 1008 ("All penalties shall be proportioned to the
nature of the offense; the true design of all punishment being to reform, not to
exterminate, mankind."); VT. CONST. of 1793 ch. II, § 32, reprinted in 6 id. at 3769-70
("[AIII fines shall be proportioned to the offences."). As Calabresi and Agudo note:
Ninety-two percent of Americans in 1868-a huge supermajority-
lived in states with constitutions that banned excessive fines. A ban on
excessive fines was found in 100% of the Southern state constitutions,
in 92% of the Midwestern-Western state constitutions, and in 90% of
the Northeastern state constitutions. Eighty-nine percent of the pre-
1855 constitutions and 100% of the post-1855 constitutions banned
excessive fines.
Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions when
the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply Rooted in
American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 82 (2008).
By way of comparison, Justice Alito's 2010 opinion for the Court in McDonald, held that
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was incorporated against the states in
part because "[i]n 1868, 22 of the 37 States in the Union had state constitutional provisions
explicitly protecting the right to keep and bear arms" and that "[a] clear majority of the
States in 1868... recognized the right to keep and bear arms as being among the
foundational rights necessary to our system of Government." 130 S. Ct. at 3042
(footnoted omitted) (citing Calabresi & Agudo, supra, at 50).
177. For current state constitution provisions prohibiting "excessive fines," see ALA.
CONST. art. I, § 15; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 15; ARK. CONST.
877
Many commentators have suggested that if the Court squarely
confronted the issue of incorporation, it would be inclined to
incorporate the Clause against the states."" Certainly, the case for
incorporation appears to be a strong one."'
art. II, § 9; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 20; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8;
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 11; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 1 XVII; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 12; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6; IND. CONST. art. I, § 16; IOWA CONST. art. I,
§ 17; KAN. CONST. BILL OF RTs. § 9; KY. CONST. § 17; ME. CONST. art. I, § 9; MD. CONST.
DECL. OF RTS. art. 25; MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XXVI; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 16; MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 5; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 28; MO. CONST. art. I, § 21; MONT. CONST. art.
II, § 22; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 9; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 33; N.J.
CONST. art. I, 12; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5; N.C. CONST. art. I, §
27; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 9; OR.
CONST. art. I, § 16; PA. CONST. art. I, § 13; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 8; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15;
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 23; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 9; VA. CONST. art. I, § 9; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14; W. VA. CONST. art.
III, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 6; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14. The Illinois and Vermont
constitutions impose explicit proportionality requirements on "all penalties" and fines.
See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("All penalties shall be determined both according to the
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful
citizenship."); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 39 ("[A]ll fines shall be proportioned to the offences.").
The Louisiana constitution prohibits "excessive ... punishment." LA. CONST. art. I, § 20.
178. See, e.g., Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the
Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1524 (2000) ("With regard to
excessive bail and excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment, it seems hard to believe
that the Court would not incorporate those rights if ever confronted with the issue,
especially given that the remaining Eighth Amendment guarantee, against cruel and
unusual punishments, has long been incorporated.") (citations omitted); Massey, supra
note 11, at 1272 ("[It seems a small enough, and a logical enough, extension [of the
Supreme Court's existing Eighth Amendment doctrine] to incorporate the excessive fines
clause into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.").
Even before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, at least one author had argued
explicitly in favor of applying the strictures of the Eighth Amendment's ban on "excessive
fines" to the states. In an 1825 treatise, William Rawle claimed that:
[Tihat the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, be confronted with the witnesses against him, have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, and the
assistance of counsel for his defence, and the 8th article [of the Bill of
Rights], that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted, are founded on
the plainest principles of justice, and alike obligatory on the
legislatures and judiciary tribunals of the states and of the United
States.
WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
125 (1825); see also AMAR, supra note 97, at 145-46, 355 n.47 (characterizing Rawle's
work as "widely read" and highlighting Rawle as one of "a considerable number of
considerable lawyers" adopting a pro-incorporation view of at least certain aspects of the
Bill of Rights prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment); but see Pervear v.
Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1866) (concluding that the Excessive Fines Clause
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2. Interpretation
Assuming arguendo the incorporation of the Excessive Fines
Clause against the states, how should we interpret the Clause? In
"does not apply to State but to National legislation"); 3 STORY, supra note 22, at §1897
("It has been held in the state courts, (and the point does not seem ever to have arisen in
the courts of the United States) that [the Eighth Amendment] does not apply to
punishments inflicted in a state court for a crime against such state; but that the
prohibition is addressed solely to the national government, and operates, as a restriction
upon its powers.").
179. But see Reyes, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 208. In Reyes, the court apparently regarded the
absence of explicit decisional law incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause as dispositive
of the issue, rather than engaging with the question whether the Clause should, as a matter
of first impression, be incorporated (based perhaps on the assumption that incorporation
is or should be the sole province of the Supreme Court).
The author is aware of very few scholarly arguments to the effect that the Excessive Fines
Clause specifically should not be incorporated against the states. Perhaps the closest such
argument is that proffered by Laurence Tribe in a 1999 article in the Harvard Law Review.
In that piece, Tribe suggests that "perhaps the most convincing candidate for a core idea
around which the privileges or immunities of United States citizenship should be
elaborated would be the basic right that genuine citizenship presupposes-the right to
individual self-government, as embodied in, but not exhausted by, some (but not all) parts
of the Bill of Rights." Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or
Immunities Revival Portend the Future-or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 110, 182-83 (1999). He then suggests that:
The one right in the Bill of Rights that the Supreme Court has
incorporated against the states but that seems unlikely to be included
either as a privilege of national citizenship (if such privileges are
limited to rights relating to self-government) or as an aspect of
procedural due process is the right not to be subjected to excessive
fines. Although that exception might be taken as an argument against
limiting the privileges or immunities of national citizenship to self-
government-related rights, or against scuttling substantive due process
once the privileges or immunities doctrine has been fully implanted, it
seems unwise and indeed illegitimate to make the architecture of
constitutional doctrine turn on one's reaction to the inclusion or
exclusion of one or even several specific, but not genuinely
foundational, rights in the resulting array.
Id. at 196 n.360 (citations omitted). Although Tribe's analysis proceeds from an apparent
assumption that the Excessive Fines Clause has been explicitly incorporated by the
Supreme Court through the Due Process Clause (an assumption that, in light of
subsequent pronouncements from the Supreme Court, seems open to question), his point
regarding individual self-government as the core meaning of privileges and immunities is
an important one. If we accept the standard modern, narrow reading of the Excessive
Fines Clause as a source of a proportionality principle tout court, it might well be difficult
to square such a provision with an individual self-government-centered view of a citizen's
privileges and immunities. If, however, one accepts the broader (and, I suggest,
historically accurate) reading of the Excessive Fines Clause as the source of an additional
norm-one focused on fundamental economic survival notwithstanding punishment-then
the relevance of the Clause to individual self-government becomes far more apparent.
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answering this question, I begin from the premise that the project of
conceptualizing the meaning of the Eighth Amendment as
incorporated against the states can be informed by examining the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment in addition to the Founding-era history of the Eighth
Amendment.o Thus, just as one might explore "how the very
meaning of freedom of speech, press, petition, and assembly was
subtly redefined in the process of being incorporated,"'81 so one might
question whether the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause might
have shifted between the Eighth Amendment's ratification in 1791
and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.mI Akhil
180. This point has admittedly not found uniform acceptance, even among originalist
authors and jurists. As Jamal Greene notes in a recent essay:
Judges, scholars, and ordinary citizens writing or speaking in the
originalist tradition consistently ignore the original understanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment even when that understanding should, on
originalist principles, control the outcome of a case. An originalist who
believes that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated against state
governments some or all of the rights protected by the Bill of Rights
should, in adjudicating cases under incorporated provisions, be
concerned primarily (if not exclusively) with determining how the
generation that ratified that amendment understood the scope and
substance of the rights at issue....
With limited exceptions, originalists do not engage in these inquiries,
tending instead to focus intently on the writings and utterances of the
eighteenth-century constitutional drafters.
Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 979 (2012); see
also id. at 978-79 (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 94 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment) (presenting an example of originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's application of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause against a state government that addressed neither the text nor history of the
Fourteenth Amendment and instead focused its analysis solely on the text and history of
the Eighth Amendment).
181. AMAR, supra note 97, at 236.
182. A somewhat analogous critique has been offered by Kurt Lash:
[Jiudicial enforcement of incorporated (or claimed incorporated)
rights focused heavily on the meaning of the texts when first added to
the constitution in 1791, while judicial enforcement of non-textual
substantive due process rights broke away from any historical analysis
whatsoever beyond an occasional nod to developments at common law
up to the modern era. Almost completely missing from both tracks of
analysis is a focus on the meaning of rights... at the time of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Amar suggests, for example, that incorporating the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment
fundamentally transformed its meaning:
Here, as elsewhere, the meaning of the Bill of Rights
shifted when its words and principles were refracted
through the prism of the later Fourteenth
Amendment. Section 1 of that amendment ... took
special aim at the abusive practices of state
governments of the Deep South, a region that had
lagged behind national norms of liberty and equality.
Even if a state legislature consistently authorized a
given punishment, that consistency hardly made the
practice "usual" when judged by the national baseline
envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, a
clause that originated in 1689 England as a limit on
(crown) judges vis-A-vis (parliamentary) legislators
morphed in 1868 into a clause empowering (federal)
judges vis-A-vis (state) legislators-and also vis-A-vis
federal legislators if Congress ever tried to enact harsh
punishments contrary to the broad consensus.
[L]ittle if any effort is made to identify legal principles at play in 1868
which informed, and constrained, the understanding of privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.
Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 455 (2009). For
a discussion of further examples of similar critiques or analysis, see Greene, supra note
180, at 979 n.6 (citing sources).
183. AMAR, supra note 172, at 134. For another take on this issue, see Michael J.
Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REv. 69, 72
(2012) ("[B]ecause the Court's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause jurisprudence
stems solely from controversies dealing with state sentences, what we think of as 'Eighth
Amendment' cases are actually Fourteenth Amendment cases" and undertaking "to
rediscover the appropriate standards governing the 'pure' Eighth Amendment,
unmediated by the Fourteenth and applicable only to the federal government.").
Somewhat relatedly, Lawrence Lessig has highlighted the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause as an example in which taking into account a text's changed context is necessary in
order to achieve "fidelity in translation." As he notes:
Such a proscription must embrace something about the
presuppositions of a culture-namely what that culture views as cruel
and unusual. At one time, flogging was not viewed as cruel; for us,
now, flogging is "cruel and unusual." If we were to proscribe "cruel
and unusual punishments" now we clearly would be proscribing
flogging. If the reader ignores this change in presuppositions, then her
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Such a dramatic transformation in meaning may well be
appropriate in light of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause's
textual commitment to the concept of the "usualness" of a particular
punishment-a concept that, notwithstanding its initial linkage to
what had been "usual" practice according to common law
precedents'" or a linkage to "usual" in the sense of longstanding
tradition'g8-has long taken on an inherently comparativist, outward-
looking meaning.'"
reading will change the meaning of the text. An application of the
Eighth Amendment that permitted flogging would be an application
that permitted, rather than proscribed, cruel and unusual punishments.
Or again, reading the amendment in the same way in this different
context would be to read into the text a different meaning.
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1188 (1993). By the same
token, one might simply approach the question whether a given fine is excessive by
referring to shared popular intuitions regarding what it means for a penalty to be
"excessive," rather than by reference to the historical meaning of the phrase "excessive
fines." If one accepts the broad definition of "excessive" proffered in Webster's 1828
dictionary-"(b]eyond the established laws of morality and religion, or beyond the bounds
of justice, fitness, propriety, expedience or utility," WEBSTER, supra note 14-then a
flexible, evolving conception of "excessiveness," which incorporates changing societal
presuppositions and context, might be appropriate even in a self-consciously originalist
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
The issue of whether to interpret the word "excessive" (1) by reference to evolving
societal presuppositions and background norms regarding the concept of excessiveness in
the punishments context, or (2) by reference to the meaning of historical prohibitions of
"excessive fines," could perhaps be seen as an instantiation of Balkin's "original
meaning"/"original expected application" dichotomy (or, alternatively, of Dworkin's
distinction between "semantic originalism" and "expectations originalism"). See JACK M.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALIsM 6-7 (2012); Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 116 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997).
I would, however, resist the notion that looking to the history of English and colonial
protections against excessive fines necessarily constitutes an inquiry merely into the
Excessive Fines Clause's expected application, because the phrase "excessive fines," as it
appears in the Eighth Amendment, is itself properly seen as a preexisting legal term of art.
See BALKIN, supra, at 45 ("[W]e want to know if the language uses generally recognized
terms of art, and what those terms of art meant at the time."); see also discussion and
sources cited supra note 23. Thus, when we turn to English precedents and commentary
regarding the Magna Carta and the 1689 Bill of Rights in order to give analytic context to
the concept of the "excessiveness" of a fine, we are exploring not just the manner in which
the Founding generation would have expected the Excessive Fines Clause to be applied,
but the meaning of the phrase itself.
184. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 974 (citations omitted) ("A requirement that punishment
not be 'unusuall'-that is, not contrary to 'usage' (Lat. 'usus') or 'precedent'-was
primarily a requirement that judges pronouncing sentence remain within the bounds of
common-law tradition.").
185. Stinneford, supra note 24, at 1767-68 ("The word also had a more specific
meaning, however, as a legal term of art: 'contrary to long usage' or 'immemorial usage.'
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In contrast, the historical evidence suggests the phrase "excessive
fines" continued to be understood-even in the post-Civil War era-
as a unique legal term of art tied to the meaning of older English
provisions barring "excessive fines." For example, Cooley's 1868
Constitutional Limitations'87-perhaps the most influential American
constitutional law treatise of the nineteenth century"-unequivocally
concludes that the constitutional prohibition against "excessive fines"
requires that "[al fine should have some reference to the party's
ability to pay it."'89  As support, Cooley cites the amercement
provisions of the Magna Carta (requiring the observance of both
proportionality and the principle of salvo contenemento) and notes
that "[t]he merciful spirit of these provisions addresses itself to the
criminal courts of the American States through the [excessive fines]
provisions of their constitutions.',90
Lawmakers during the 1860s similarly appear to have recognized
the historical linkage between the traditional amercement practices
outlined in the Magna Carta and the meaning of the constitutional
A review of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century legal and political history shows that this
last meaning is the only one that may plausibly be attributed to the term 'unusual' in the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause."); see also id. at 1764
("Where the law requires judges to follow longstanding precedent in imposing a sentence,
then a given sentence can be illegal by virtue of being unusual. But where the law does not
require judges to follow longstanding precedent-for example, where a court follows a
new statute that calls for the imposition of a less severe punishment for a given crime than
was imposed at common law-the sentence can be unusual without being illegal.").
186. For discussions of the Court's glosses on the meaning of the word "unusual," see
Ryan, supra note 145; Joshua L. Shapiro, And Unusual: Examining the Forgotten Prong of
the Eighth Amendment, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 465 (2008); and Stinneford, supra note 24.
187. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF AMERICAN UNION
(1868).
188. See EDWIN S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 116-18 (1948)
(describing Cooley's treatise as "the most influential . . . ever published on American
constitutional law"); McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3068 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing
Cooley's treatise as "influential"); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,
107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 778 (1994) (describing the treatise as "monumental"); see
generally CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF
THOMAS M. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 27-32 (1973) (discussing Cooley's treatise).
189. COOLEY,supra note 187, at 328.
190. Id. at 329; see also House & Lot v. State, 85 So. 382 (Ala. 1920) ("By Magna
Charta a freeman was not to be amerced for a small fault, but according to the degree of
the fault, and for a great crime in proportion to the heinousness of it, saving to him his
contenement. And Judge Cooley says that the merciful spirit of these provisions addresses
itself to the criminal courts of the American States through provisions of their
Constitutions.").
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phrase "excessive fines." An 1864 speech by the Pennsylvania
Republican Senator Edgar Cowan-delivered on the floor of the
Senate just two years before the introduction of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Congressm---is illustrative. After noting that "[a]n
'excessive fine' is a technical term as well known to the law as that of
larceny or any other legal term susceptible of exact definition,"
Cowan defined the phrase "excessive fines" with reference to the
amercement limitations of the Magna Carta, suggesting that a
constitutional fine must "save[] to the freeholder his tenement, to the
merchant his merchandise, to the villein his wainage" and that such a
fine must "be determined from the condition of the man how much
he could pay without touching the sustenance of his wife and
children."'m
Additionally, in the years following reconstruction, state courts
would continue to cite to Blackstone's definition of "excessive fines"
in interpreting the meaning of excessive fines clauses in state
constitutions. For example, in 1887, the Florida Supreme Court,
citing Blackstone, noted that:
The duration and quantity of each [fine] must, says
Blackstone, frequently vary from the aggravation, or
otherwise, of the offense, the quality and condition of
the parties, and from innumerable other circumstances,
and the quantum, in particular, of pecuniary fines
neither can nor ought to be ascertained by an
invariable; and he says the statute law has not often,
and the common law never, ascertained the quantity of
fines.'93
191. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 561 (1864) (statement of Sen. Edgar
Cowan).
192. Id.
If anything, the case for reading an individual-focused economic-survival norm into the
Excessive Fines Clause might seem to be strengthened by the historical context of the
Reconstruction Amendments. Cf Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A
Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37, 40 (1990)
("When the Reconstruction Amendments are viewed as a whole, a radically different
vision of society emerges. Precisely because the Fifteenth Amendment gave former slaves
the right to vote, and the Fourteenth Amendment made them citizens by dint of their
birth, we should interpret the Thirteenth Amendment to guarantee each American a
certain minimum stake in society. Otherwise, We the People of the United States really
failed to set the slaves free-free from economic dependence.") (footnotes omitted).
193. Frese v. State, 2 So. 1, 2 (Fla. 1887) (emphasis added).
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As late as 1902, a member of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia would recall that "[tihe rule, as old as the written law, is that
a fine must have reference to the estate of the defendant," citing
Blackstone's maxim that "'[w]hat is ruin to one man's fortune, may be
a matter of indifference to another's."'"9  Indeed, courts expressed
similar sentiments well into the twentieth century. 95
V. The Modern Case for Reincorporating "Economic
Survival" into Excessive Fines Clause Jurisprudence
Blackstone's suggestion that an "excessive fine" would
"amount[] to imprisonment for life"'96 might seem anachronistic or
quaint today; we generally think of debtors' prisons as belonging to
another age entirely.1 9 However, similar concerns-including the
194. Doyle v. Commonwealth, 40 S.E. 925, 930 (Va. 1902) (Cardwell, J., dissenting).
Other courts, perhaps unconsciously, have also echoed Blackstone's maxim. See, e.g.,
People ex rel. Waller v. 1992 Oldsmobile Station Wagon, VIN IG3BP8376NW300058, 638
N.E.2d 373, 377 (Ill. App Ct. 1994) ("[Tlhe value of a car may be a pittance to a rich man
and a fortune to a poor man.").
195. See, e.g., State v. Staub, 162 So. 766, 768 (La. 1935) ("What constitutes an
excessive fine for the violation of a penal statute depends in part .. . upon the ability of the
defendant to pay. A fine which in one case would be only slight punishment, because
easily paid, might in another case be excessive, because its payment would be ruinous to
the convict."); In re Hershey Farms, 24 N.Y.S.2d 163, 166 (N.Y. Gen. Sess. 1941) (quoting
15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, § 551) ("A fine is excessive if it seriously impairs his ability to
gain a livelihood."); Cohen v. State, 195 A. 532, 539 (Md. Ct. App. 1937) ("[W]hen a fine is
imposed, it should be done with due regard to the ability of the defendant to pay. . . ."); Cf
State v. Ross, 104 P. 596, 474 (Or. 1909) (overruled by State v. Hanna, 356 P.2d 1046 (Or.
1960)) ("[Ilmprisonment [ ] for life, for the nonpayment of [a] fine,... is a cruel and
unusual punishment."). Not all state courts, however, agreed on this point. See, e.g.,
Poindexter v. State, 193 S.W. 126, 128 (Tenn. 1917) ("A fine is proportioned to the gravity
of the offense punished, and the financial ability of a defendant to pay is not ordinarily
considered."); Conley v. State, 11 S.E. 659 (Ga. 1890); State v. Little, 42 Iowa 51, 56 (1875)
("It seems to us that this is one of the cases which call for severe punishment. In view of
the fact that the extent of the punishment in such cases is fixed by law at one thousand
dollars, we think a fine of half that sum is far from being excessive in this case.").
196. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *371; see discussion supra note 116 and
accompanying text.
197. See Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 24 (1926-1927)
("Imprisonment for debt is usually thought of as a barbarous custom ... which was totally
done away with long ago."); see also Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered
Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to
Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589,
610 (2000) (describing debtors' prisons as "Dickensian"); PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND
BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900 (1974) (discussing the history and abolition of the practice of
imprisonment for debt); but see, e.g., Recent Legislation, Alabama Raises the Rates at
Which Individuals in Jail for Nonpayment of Fines Earn Out Their Debts, 116 HARV. L.
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imposition of monetary sanctions significantly exceeding a
defendant's ability to pay and fundamentally impairing the prospects
for the defendant's rehabilitation and reintegration as a productive
member of society-remain highly relevant today.
A 2010 study, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry,
powerfully makes this case.' In that study, the authors conclude that
"[d]espite the fact that most criminal defendants are indigent, none of
the fifteen examined states pay adequate attention to whether
individuals have the resources to pay criminal justice debt, either
when courts determine how much debt to impose or during the debt
collection process."' Consequently, "[t]he result is a system
effectively designed to turn individuals with criminal convictions into
permanent debtors."2" This can seriously impact the capacity of
defendants to reintegrate as productive members of society: for
defendants, "unpaid criminal justice debt ... can impact everything
from their employment and housing opportunities, to their financial
stability, to their right to vote."201 As another commentator notes,
REV. 735, 735 (2002) ("Incarceration for 'public,' not 'private,' debts is typically not
considered 'imprisonment for debt' within the meaning of state constitutional prohibitions
198. ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA, & REBEKAH DILLER, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY (2010). In the wake of this report, the role of
criminal justice debt-or, as it is sometimes termed, "legal financial obligations" (LFOs)-
has come under greater scrutiny. See, e.g., Michael L. Vander Giessen, Note, Legislative
Reforms for Washington State's Criminal Monetary Penalties, 47 GONz. L. REV. 547, 551
(2012) ("[M]any [have] criticize[d] criminal monetary penalties as creating de facto
debtors' prisons.").
199. BANNON ET AL., supra note 198, at 13.
200. Id.; see AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF
AMERICA'S NEW DEBTORS' PRISONS (2010), http://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights-racial-
justice/aclu-and-brennan-center-reports-expose-resurgence-debtors-prisons; Ethan
Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as Companies Add Huge Fees for Probation, N.Y. TIMES, July
2, 2012, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/us/probation-fees-multiply-
as-companies-profit.html; Editorial, Return of Debtors' Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2012,
at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/14/opinion/return-of-debtors-
prisons.html.
201. BANNON ET AL, supra note 198, at 13. A number of courts have also recognized
the rehabilitation-related issues that the imposition of an excessive fine can raise. See, e.g.,
State v. Meador, 01CO1-9011CR00291, 1992 WL 85795 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 1992)
(concluding that "[aIn oppressive fine can disrupt future rehabilitation and prevent a
defendant from becoming a productive member of society"); see also Alec Samuels, The
Fine, 41 J. CRIM. L. 192, 193-94 (1977) (summarizing the contemporary approach of
English courts to setting fines and concluding that "[e]arning capacity, status and age are
properly to be taken into account" as factors militating in favor of a reduced fine because
"[ain excessive fine may be counterproductive, leading to default, distress, desperation,
possibly further offences") (citing R. v. Lobley, (1974) 59 Cr. App. R. 63; R. v. Thompson,
[19741 Crim. L.R. 720).
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"[s]ince the 1990s, state and local governments across the nation
increasingly have turned to fees imposed on criminal defendants to
keep their justice systems afloat in economically tough times" and
"[t]hreats of more jail time for nonpayment ... constantly loom."2
Such phenomena appear to have accelerated in recent years, amid the
serious fiscal issues affecting many state and local governments.203 As
a result, it has been suggested that "heavy-handed tactics used to
collect from ex-offenders signal a return, in effect, to debtors'
prisons."a As one commentator has recently noted:
Criminal justice debt drags people further away from
reintegration with civil society. A person's life can
spiral out of control when interest accrues, late fees
are incurred, a driver's license is revoked, and persons
are ineligible for public assistance, which means that
unpaid criminal justice debt snowballs. You cannot
get blood from a stone, but if you try, you can break
the stone.
Optimal punishment is swift and sure, but it has a
defined endpoint. As with bankruptcy, punishment
must end, leaving both hope and opportunity. It is
doubtful that incarceration for criminal justice debt or
its threat could increase deterrence enough to be
202. John Gibeaut, Get Out of Jail-But Not Free: Courts Scramble To Fill Their
Coffers by Sticking Ex-Cons with Fees, ABA J., July 2012, at 50, 52.
203. Ann K. Wagner, The Conflict over Bearden v. Georgia in State Courts: Plea-
Bargained Probation Terms and the Specter of Debtors' Prison, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
383, 388 (2010) ("The budget crises faced by many state and local governments have
already led to other aggressive strategies to collect debts from probationers, prompting
highly critical coverage in the press . . .") (citing sources); see also, e.g., Ann Cammett,
Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN
ST. L. REv. 349, 404 (2012) ("[O]nce a person is caught in the vortex of criminalization,
debt arises from the criminal justice system itself through the imposition of court costs,
fees, and restitution. Thus, the emerging practice of incarcerating civil debtors, no matter
how short a time, foreshadows trouble for those living on the economic margins, in
numbers that have increased significantly during an era of economic recession."); Jason
Zweig, Are Debtors' Prisons Coming Back?, WALL ST. J. TOTAL RETURN BLOG, Aug. 28,
2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2012/08/28/are-debtors-prisons-coming-back (citing
sources).
204. Id.; see also Judith Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial
Rights in an Age of Egalitarianism: The Childress Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 917, 967
(2012) ("[S]tates have begun to impose additional fees, fines, and special assessments (as
states seek to augment limited budgets) that have resulted in a resurgence of 'debtors'
prisons,' populated by individuals held in contempt for failure to comply with court
payment orders.").
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worth the extra costs of imprisonment to the state.
Releasing people with little hope or opportunity for
reintegration with civil society, however, is good
neither for the releasees nor for society.205
Similarly, the authors of a recent empirical study on the impact
of criminal justice debt conclude that "[b]y reducing income; limiting
access to housing, credit, transportation, and employment; and
increasing the chances of ongoing criminal justice involvement,
monetary sanctions significantly expand the duration and intensity of
penalties associated with a criminal conviction." 206 Criminal justice
debt can also inhibit felons' ability to regain political rights, with such
obligations "routinely hinder[ing] the formal resumption of voting
205. Alexander Tabarrok, Fugitives, Outlaws, and the Lessons of Safe Surrender, 11
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 461, 466 (2012); see also Travis Stearns, Intimately Related
to the Criminal Process: Examining the Consequences of A Conviction After Padilla v.
Kentucky and State v. Sandoval, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 855, 874 (2011) ("Even for
those men and women with unpaid LFOs who do not end up back behind bars, their
substantial legal debts pose a significant, and at times insurmountable, barrier as they
attempt to reenter society. They see their incomes reduced, their credit ratings worsen,
their prospects for housing and employment dim, and their chances of ending up back in
jail or prison increase."); Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, Mercenary Criminal
Justice (unpublished manuscript, 2013) (highlighting the troubling effects of LFOs and
suggesting reforms).
206. Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from Stones:
Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753,
1792 (2010). Similarly, an in-depth study of criminal defendants in Washington State
concluded:
[Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs)] added to the difficulties [of
reintegration into society following conviction] by reducing income
and worsening credit ratings, both of which make it more difficult to
secure stable housing. LFOs also hindered people's efforts to improve
their education and occupational situations, and created incentives to
avoid work, to return to crime, and/or to hide from the authorities.
Perhaps most strikingly, the inability to make regular payments toward
their legal debt led many of those interviewed to have warrants issued
for their arrest, and be arrested and jailed either as a penalty for non-
payment or as a means of reducing their debt. Notably, researchers
have found that each of these consequences-reduced earnings and
employment, difficulties finding stable housing, and short-term jail
stays-are associated with recidivism.
KATHERINE BECKETT, ALEXES HARRIS & HEATHER EVANS, THE ASSESSMENT AND
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE
(Olympia: Wash. State Minority & Justice Comm'n, 2008).
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rights after criminalization, even after state disenfranchisement
schemes no longer serve that function."'
In short, "a growing body of evidence now suggests that criminal
justice debt leads to serious unintended consequences--consequences
that harm the individual, the community, and the criminal justice
system itself."" The pernicious effects of criminal justice debt are
particularly significant given the nondischargability of obligations
under the Bankruptcy Code "to the extent such debt is for a fine,
penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental
unit."209 In apparent recognition of the significant harms that
inadequately tailored criminal fines can impose on offenders, the
ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice provide that "[an offender's
ability to pay should be a factor in determining the amount of the
sanction" and that "[s]entencing courts, in imposing a fine on an
207. Cammett, supra note 203, at 354. Cammett suggests that "the requirement that
ex-felons pay all LFOs or other debt before they are allowed to restore voting rights is
simply not rationally related to a legitimate state interest and also runs counter to
significant policy prerogatives that should be further illuminated within the policy
discourse surrounding prisoners and reentry." Id. at 401; but see id. at 390-91
(acknowledging that "all of the appellate courts that have considered the issue have
concluded that payment of LFOs before the restoration of voting rights is constitutional,
regardless of a person's ability to pay") (footnote omitted). On felon disenfranchisement
generally, see INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Deborah N. Archer &
Kele S. Williams, Making America "The Land of Second Chances": Restoring
Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 527 (2006);
Richard M. Re & Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement and
the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584 (2012).
208. Alexandra Shookhoff, Robert Constantino & Evan Elkin, The Unintended
Sentence of Criminal Justice Debt, 24 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER 62,63 (2011); see
also Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Money Sanctions as
Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 509, 509-10 (2011) ("The widespread
assessment of substantial and nongraduated fees and fines is incompatible with policy
efforts to enhance reintegration, lacks a convincing penological rationale, and raises
numerous concerns about justice and fairness. Moreover, reliance on this revenue stream
to fund key government operations is inefficient and creates undesirable conflicts of
interest for judges and other criminal justice actors.").
209. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006); see generally Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof
Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 715 n.371 (2006) ("Criminal fines are typically not
treated as ordinary contractual debts to society. State and federal laws frequently provide
that exemptions from collection shall not apply to fines or taxes.") (citing sources); Mona
Lewandoski, Barred from Bankruptcy: Recently Incarcerated Debtors in and Outside
Bankruptcy, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 191, 203 (2010) ("Most debts arising
from the commission of a crime are not dischargeable. Depending on the bankruptcy
chapter, such debts may include criminal restitution, taxes on illegal activity, civil damages
for personal injury from drunk driving, willful and malicious injury to others, larceny,
court fees, and many other civil and criminal fines, penalties, and forfeitures.") (footnote
omitted).
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individual, should consider the offender's obligations, particularly
family obligations."210 Likewise, a number of criminal law theorists
have also argued in favor of taking ability to pay into account when
calculating fines.2 n
Financial penalties212 that push an individual beyond a certain
fundamental level of economic survival and self-sufficiency are
unnecessarily harsh and utterly counterproductive. Of course, "the
Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and
economic ill,"' and whether such penalties are good policy is a
210. ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 18-3.16 at 113 (3d ed.
1994), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal-justice-section
archive/crimjust standardssentencing blkold.html.
211. See, e.g., 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 133 (Richard Hildreth
trans., Boston, Weeks, Jordon, & Co. 1840) (1802) ("Pecuniary punishments should
always be regulated by the fortune of the offender."). In the modern era, so-called "day
fines"-fines which are linked (1) to the severity of the offense and (2) to the daily income
of the offender-have been widely advocated, and adopted in certain jurisdictions. See
Sally T. Hillsman, Fines and Day Fines, 12 CRIME & JUST. 49, 54 (1990); see also Gary M.
Friedman, The West German Day-Fine System: A Possibility for the United States?, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 281, 304 (1983); Sally T. Hillsman & Judith A. Greene, Tailoring Criminal
Fines to the Financial Means of the Offender, 72 JUDICATURE 38 (1988); NORVAL
MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION 141 (1990) ("[I]t is
axiomatic that a just fine must be calculated in relation to the offender's means, earning
capacity, and financial obligations to dependents."). The primary concern of such schemes
is to more carefully calibrate the deterrent and punitive effect of fines. It is important to
recognize, however, that such schemes are distinct in an important way from the
"economic survival norm" I discuss in this work. I do not suggest fines must be
proportional to an offender's ability to pay (i.e., that there must be a direct relationship
between the fine and the defendant's means). See, e.g., Frank Jordans, Speeding Fines
Being Linked to Income in Europe, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 11, 2010 (discussing a Swiss
court's imposition of a USD $290,000 fine for speeding in light of the offender's wealth).
In contrast, I suggest simply the Excessive Fines Clause imposes a limiting principle such
that the power to impose otherwise-proportionate fines and forfeitures be subject to an
"ability to pay" or "livelihood-protection" determination-in effect, imposing a
constitutional "ceiling" on the level of monetary penalties for a given defendant in light of
that defendant's wealth and earnings capacity. Thus, even if one were to accept (contra
current doctrine) the notion of "symmetric proportionality" in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, see Parr, supra note 9, the Excessive Fines Clause under this framework
would still not require that fines exhibit a direct relationship to offenders' means.
212. For the sake of simplicity, I limit my discussion here to criminal fines and
forfeitures, and do not consider the separate issue of fees that are assessed on defendants
or inmates. Some courts have suggested the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause might not
encompass such fees. See, e.g., Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410,
420 (3d Cir. 2000) (suggesting certain categories of fees imposed on prisoners might not
"fit th[e] mold" of "fines" as that term is used in the Excessive Fines Clause).
213. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); cf United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct.
2537, 2565, 183 L. Ed. 2d 574 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Not every foolish law is
unconstitutional."); Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of the Dist. of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 570
(1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The criterion of constitutionality is not whether we
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distinct question from whether they are unconstitutional. But the
text, history, and purpose of the Excessive Fines Clause suggest that
those monetary penalties that are set at such a level that they cannot
possibly be repaid (and which consequently inhibit reintegration into
society) are appropriately encompassed by the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on the imposition of "excessive fines."
It is true that the Supreme Court's Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence does bar the incarceration of a defendant solely
because of inability to pay214at least in theory."' However, the
explicit recognition of a constitutional barrier even to the imposition
of a fine that exceeds a level that a defendant might ever reasonably
believe the law to be for the public good."); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 552, 20 L.
Ed. 287 (1870) ("Admit it was a hardship, but it is not every hardship that is unjust, much
less that is unconstitutional; and certainly it would be an anomaly for us to hold an act of
Congress invalid merely because we might think its provisions harsh and unjust."); see
generally 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1937) (statement of James Wilson) ("Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may
be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the
Judges in refusing to give them effect.").
214. See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1983) ("[If [a] probationer
has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot do so through
no fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically without
considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are
available."); see also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970).
215. But see BANNON ET AL., supra note 198 (alleging "state courts across the country
routinely ignore th[e] command [of the Supreme Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence]
and send people to jail without the required hearing to determine whether a defendant is
indigent"); Beckett & Harris, supra note 208, at 529 (concluding that, despite Bearden,
"the incarceration of debtors without consideration of their ability to pay continues to
occur with some regularity in states and localities across the country"); Wright & Logan,
supra note 205, at 45 (noting "the increasing practical irrelevance of Bearden v. Georgia"
and suggesting that "[tioday, the case is often construed narrowly or disregarded
altogether") (citing sources); see also, e.g., Editorial, Debtors' prison-Again, TAMPA BAY
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2009, http://www.tampabay.com/opinionleditorials/article991963.ece
("[S]everal courts in Florida have resurrected the de facto debtor's prison-having
thousands of Floridians jailed for failing to pay assessed court fees and fines.... In the
United States, it is unconstitutional to incarcerate someone solely for failing to pay a debt.
Florida officials get around this by claiming the defendants are going to jail not for their
debts but for violating a court order. That is what you would call a self-serving
technicality."); Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez, Bringing Transparency and
Accountability to Criminal Justice Institutions in the South, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 455,
472 (2011) ("The criminal justice system has ... become self-propelling, increasingly
imposing huge fines and fees on criminal defendants to fund its operations.... This trend
has a tremendous impact on the poor, and anecdotal evidence suggests that defendants'
families often bear these costs. Failure-or inability-to pay such fees can result in re-
incarceration."); WA Jails People for Court Debt; Experts Critical, SEATTLE TIMES (May
24, 2009), http://seattletimes.nwsource.comlhtmllocalnews/2009257861-apwacourtfines.
html.
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be expected to pay would both be consistent with the text and history
of the Eighth Amendment, and would serve as a valuable measure of
further protection for criminal defendants.2 16 Even if we were to
assume (contrary to much evidence) that current Equal Protection
doctrine is successful in keeping individuals from being imprisoned
solely due to inability to pay a penalty, being subjected to unpayable
criminal justice debt can still result in a number of devastating
collateral consequences short of imprisonment.
Moreover, understanding certain aspects of indigency-related
doctrine as grounded in the Eighth Amendment, rather than the
Equal Protection Clause, arguably provides a firmer textual basis on
which to develop and strengthen such rights.217 Certainly,
216. See Ann K. Wagner, The Conflict over Bearden v. Georgia in State Courts: Plea-
Bargained Probation Terms and the Specter of Debtors' Prison, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
383, 385 (2010) (criticizing Bearden for not "requir[ing] an estimate of ability to pay at
initial sentencing" despite the fact that "one might think that at least some repayment
problems are avoided when sentencing judges make an effort to do so").
A greater focus on offenders' ability to pay during the calculation of penalties might also
benefit the enforcement agencies themselves; for example, it might help (at least at the
margins) to militate the current embarrassing "collection gap" between assessed penalties
and collected penalties. See Ezra Ross & Martin Pritikin, The Collection Gap:
Underenforcement of Corporate and White-Collar Fines and Penalties, 29 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 453, 483 (2011) (noting that the "DOJ has collected as little as 4% of
outstanding criminal debt in recent years" and that "[e]ven when agency personnel are
acting diligently and competently, offenders may lack means to pay the fine") (citing U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-664, CRIMINAL DEBT: OVERSIGHT AND
ACTIONS NEEDED To ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN COLLECTION PROCESSES 10 (2001);
U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-338, CRIMINAL DEBT: ACTIONS STILL
NEEDED To ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN JUSTICE'S COLLECTION PROCESSES 3, 27
(2004)).
217. Cf. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) ("[I1f a constitutional
claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth
Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific
provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.").
The notion that certain aspects of indigency-protection doctrine currently based on the
Equal Protection Clause could be augmented by rights sounding in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence is not an entirely new idea. See, e.g., Note, Fining the Indigent, 71 COLUM.
L. REV. 1281, 1283 (1971) (lamenting the fact that "[e]ven though the United States
Constitution prohibits 'cruel and unusual punishment' and 'excessive fines,' those terms
have not been given enough substantive content to provide a constitutional basis for an
attack on an authorized sentence as being inappropriate") (footnote omitted). In fact, a
little-noticed indigency-protection Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence had arguably
begun to develop in the years prior to the emergence of the Supreme Court's Equal
Protection indigency jurisprudence. See People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 104 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1966) ("The phrase 'excessive fine', if it is to mean anything, must apply to any fine
which notably exceeds in amount that which is reasonable, usual, proper or just. A fine of
$500 for a common misdemeanor, levied on a man who has no money at all, is necessarily
excessive when it means in reality that he must be jailed for a period far longer than the
892 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY f Vol. 40:4
Summer 20131 EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE ORIGINAL MEANING
rediscovering the indigency-protection promise of the Eighth
Amendment would unquestionably be of value to litigants in the
event that the Supreme Court elects to weaken current Equal
Protection-grounded doctrine relating to indigency status. 2 18
VI. Doctrinal Implications
Throughout this Article, I have sought to examine the case for
understanding "economic survival" as a core Eighth Amendment
norm. A brief discussion of some of the potential doctrinal
implications of this thesis follows. One hesitates to propose a single,
integrated test for determining whether a forfeiture or fine is
unconstitutionally excessive from the perspective of "economic
survival": such a determination is inherently fact-intensive and
context-dependent, and requires a court to undertake a difficult
balancing of competing interests.219  But many courts today do not
normal period for the crime, since it deprives the defendant of all ability to earn a
livelihood for 500 days and since it has the necessary effect of keeping him in the
penitentiary far longer than would ordinarily be the case."); People v. McMillan, 279
N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (Orange County Ct. 1967); State v. Allen, 104 N.J. Super. 187, 201-02,
249 A.2d 70, 77-78 (App. Div. 1969); Ex parte Carr, 1961 OK CR 89, 365 P.2d 392, 393
(noting in dicta that "to confine an indigent person in the county jail until he pays a $5,000
fine at $1 per day would be cruel and excessive"); cf Moore v. United States, 150 F.2d 323,
325 (10th Cir. 1945) (suggesting in dicta that "a fine which is beyond the ability of one to
pay or which takes a substantial portion of one's assets would be excessive and arbitrary").
218. See Andrew M. Siegel, From Bad to Worse?: Some Early Speculation About the
Roberts Court and the Constitutional Fate of the Poor, 59 S.C. L. REV. 851 (2008). As
Siegel notes, despite the Supreme Court's failure to treat poverty as a suspect classification
under the Equal Protection Clause, a number of "interstitial constitutional protection[s]
for the poor" have remained part of the Court's jurisprudence. Id. at 857; see generally
ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT, WELFARE
RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997) (discussing the welfare
rights movement); Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1277, 1282-84 (1993). Siegel suggests that, although the Rehnquist court
refrained from revisiting a number of these early, Equal Protection Clause-grounded
precedents, "there are some serious reasons to think that the Roberts Court will not do
the same." Siegel, supra, at 863. Justice Thomas, for example, has characterized the equal
protection theory of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)-which undergirds this entire
line of cases-as one "which was dubious ab initio and which has been undermined since."
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 133 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
219. At the outset, let me emphasize that my discussion here is focused on the
doctrinal implications for the realm of criminal fines and forfeitures jurisprudence.
Consequently, I do not address the potential implications of a recognition of an explicit
"economic survival" norm to, for example, the criminal restitution context, except to note
that the recognition of such a norm for fines and forfeitures jurisprudence does not
necessarily imply that such a norm also be applied in the context of restitution. There is
some uncertainty among courts and commentators on the question of whether restitution
is imposed in furtherance of punitive or compensatory goals. See, e.g., Andrew Kull,
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attempt to balance these interests at all, at least on a constitutional
level, and instead adhere dogmatically to the notion that the
Excessive Fines Clause speaks only to a conceptualization of
"excessiveness" along the dimension of proportionality between
offense and penalty amount. Such a narrow conceptualization of the
Excessive Fines Clause analysis is not compelled by the Court's
holding in Bajakajian, is inconsistent with the long history of
excessive fines protections in the Anglo-American legal tradition, and
results in a cramped constitutional inquiry in which a real risk of
injustice inheres. The Supreme Court is surely correct in
characterizing the provision of some measure of proportionality
between penalty and offense as a core constitutional concern in the
Excessive Fines Clause context-but in light of the text, history, and
purpose of the Clause, it should not be understood to represent the
entirety of the inquiry.
It is important to recognize that a constitutional jurisprudence
faithful to the economic-survival aspects of the Eighth Amendment's
original meaning would not simply absolve a criminal defendant of
any need to pay a fine if he or she did not have the necessary funds on
hand: as noted above,220 even by the thirteenth century, courts had
recognized that criminal defendants could be required to pay criminal
penalties in installment so as to satisfy punitive, deterrent, and
retributivist goals while simultaneously protecting defendants. Thus,
an appropriate constitutional test, in light of the history of the
Excessive Fines Clause, might well resemble the current Federal
Sentencing Guidelines provision that a fine not be assessed "where
the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to
Restitution's Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 17, 17 n.1 (2003) (noting that "the question
whether [criminal] restitution is punitive is actively litigated"); Heidi M. Grogan,
Comment, Characterizing Criminal Restitution Pursuant to the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act: Focus on the Third Circuit, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1079, 1079 (2005) (discussing
the split on this issue and citing sources); see generally Note, Victim Restitution in the
Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1984) (discussing the
various goals of restitution); Note, Restitution and the Criminal Law, 39 COLUM. L. REV.
1185 (1939). As a result, there is some lack of clarity on the issue of whether the Excessive
Fines Clause applies to restitution orders imposed in the criminal sentencing context. See,
e.g., United States v. Newell, 658 F.3d 1, 35 (1st Cir. 2011) ("We have never held that the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to restitution."); United States
v. Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 1998) (suggesting that financial hardship is
irrelevant in the restitution context). Likewise, my discussion does not focus on the
potential implications of the recognition of an Eighth Amendment-grounded "economic
survival" norm on other areas of criminal procedure, or indeed on other areas of
constitutional law more generally.
220. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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become able to pay any fine" and "[i]n determining the amount of the
fine, the court shall consider," among other things, "any evidence
presented as to the defendant's ability to pay the fine (including the
ability to pay over a period of time) in light of his earning capacity
and financial resources" and "the burden that the fine places on the
defendant and his dependents relative to alternative punishments."2
Indeed, these provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines should be
222
regarded as implementing an important constitutional norm.
Moreover, the development of a jurisprudence that effectively
constitutionalized these protections could be important for several
reasons. First, it would transform these protections against
oppressive criminal fines from post-Booker advisory guidelines into
binding constitutional law.223  At a minimum, in light of these
221. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a) (emphasis added).
Of course, it is true that determining "ability to pay" can in many circumstances be a
challenging process. As a recent study notes:
[Niothing is simple in assessing an individual's ability to pay. Relying
on legislative, judicial, or administrative efforts to determine an
individual's financial status or capacity is fraught with complications.
To gain an accurate picture of the income position of an individual,
whose work record is irregular at best, is constantly changing, and has
financial obligations that might extend across multiple institutional
arenas (child support, restitution, court, and state obligations in
addition to informal or formal loans taken from family and friends)
only can be beset by inaccuracies.
Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Mitali Nagrech, A New Punishment Regime, 10
CRIMINOLOGY. & PUB. POL'Y 555 (2011) (quotation omitted).
222. Such a view would be consistent with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that "if [a]
sentencing court complies with [the relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions], any
constitutional ability-to-pay limitation will necessarily be met." United States v. Hines, 88
F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 1996). For further discussion of this strand of Eighth Circuit
doctrine, see supra note 60.
Recognition of the constitutional grounding of this provision of the Sentencing Guidelines
might well encourage courts not to adopt a highly restrictive interpretation of this rule,
such as that suggested by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Gomez, 24 F.3d 924 (7th
Cir. 1994). See id. at 926-27 ("[T]he judge must impose a fine, unless the defendant
demonstrates that he cannot pay anything, either at sentencing or in the foreseeable
future. Defendants bear a heavy burden, because almost everyone has or will acquire
some assets.") (citations omitted).
223. In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Supreme Court rendered the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory. The possibility Congress
might make the Guidelines mandatory for criminal fines, if not for other punishments, was
essentially foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Southern Union Company v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012), which held that the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000) applied to the determination of criminal fines.
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constitutional issues, imposing a fine that exceeds any capacity for
repayment should, in the language of post-Booker sentencing review,
be regarded as per se substantively unreasonable.2 24 Second, it could
provide a powerful corrective to the current practice in many states of
imposing large penalties on criminal defendants with little or no
regard to those defendants' ability to pay."
Arguably, a historically grounded Excessive Fines Clause
jurisprudence would require not just that a fine be set such that it
could reasonably be expected to be paid, but require that it be paid
while permitting an individual to maintain some minimal level of
economic subsistence. This distinction becomes particularly relevant
in the context of constitutional forfeiture jurisprudence: simply
relying on a measure of "ability to pay" to proxy livelihood-
protection or economic-survival interests is unlikely to be particularly
helpful in the forfeiture context, as the owner of an asset subject to
forfeiture proceedings is, by definition, "able" to pay. But the history
of the Excessive Fines Clause suggests a modestly more demanding
standard may be appropriate: protecting and preserving offenders'
ability to contribute usefully to their communities, notwithstanding
the imposition of a monetary penalty, was a core purpose of this
constitutional provision. In an era of aggressive use of forfeiture
statutes, reincorporating such considerations into Excessive Fines
Clause jurisprudence could result in a constitutional law of forfeitures
that is both more faithful to our constitutional history, and more
sensitive to the plight of owners of property subject to forfeiture
proceedings. The First Circuit's emerging constitutional forfeiture
jurisprudence, which recognizes the economic survival dimension of
the Excessive Fines Clause inquiry, represents an important step in
this direction.
224. Accord United States v. Kakoullis, 150 F. App'x 80, 82 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Imposing
a fine that the defendant is unable to pay is an abuse of discretion.") (citing United States
v. Salameh, 261 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 2001)). On post-Booker "reasonableness review" of
federal sentences generally, see Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate
Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2008); and Anne Louise Marshall,
Note, How Do Federal Courts of Appeals Apply Booker Reasonableness Review After
Gall?, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1419 (2008).
225. See BANNON ET AL, supra note 198; Ethan Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as
Companies Add Huge Fees for Probation, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/us/probation-fees-multiply-as-companies-profit.html;
see also Return of Debtors' Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/07/14/opinion/return-of-debtors-prisons.html.
This point assumes the eventual incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause. See supra
notes 154 through 168 and accompanying text.
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In a similar vein, a number of courts have suggested that when
the government seeks to seize a defendant's home in a forfeiture
action, such forfeitures should be subject to a particularly searching
Eighth Amendment review.226 The history of the Excessive Fines
226. For one notable example, see United States v. 461 Shelby County Rd. 361, 857 F.
Supp. 935, 938 (N.D. Ala. 1994). The Shelby court justified its decision on the grounds
that homesteads were "historically given a high degree of protection" (although the court
did not develop this point further) and in light of concerns over the particularly negative
societal impact associated with a forfeiture of the primary residence of a criminal
defendant and his family. Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See United
States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. 9638
Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. One Parcel of Real
Prop. with Buildings, Appurtenances & Improvements k/a 45 Claremont St., Located in
City of Cent. Falls, R.I., 395 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Dodge Caravan
Grand SE/Sport Van, VIN No. 1B4GP44G2YB7884560, 387 F.3d 758, 763 (8th Cir. 2004);
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney v. Reese, 136 P.3d 364, 370 (Idaho Ct. App.
2006); United States v. Real Prop. in Name SOF Dexter F. Leslie & Odetta 0. Leslie, 203
F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that "no member of his family resides in" the home as a
relevant factor in concluding that forfeiture is not unconstitutionally excessive): State v.
Real Prop. at 633 E. 640 N., Orem, Utah, 994 P.2d 1254, 1258 (directing courts to consider
"intangible, subjective value of the property" in the excessiveness calculus); United States
v. One 1992 Isuzu Trooper VIN No. JACDH58W3N79112571, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1274
(M.D. Ala. 1999) (including both the "nature and value of the property forfeited" as
relevant considerations); cf United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43,
61 (1993) ("The constitutional limitations we enforce in this case apply to real property in
general, not simply to residences. That said, the case before us well illustrates an essential
principle: Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights. At stake in this
and many other forfeiture cases are the security and privacy of the home and those who
take shelter within it."); People v. One 2000 GMC VIN 3GNFK16T2YG169852, 876, 829
N.E.2d 437, 440 (2005) ("Forfeiture of personal property is less harsh than forfeiture of
real estate."); People ex rel. Waller v. 1996 Saturn, VIN 1G82H5282TZ113572, 699 N.E.2d
223, 228 (1998) ("A higher value is placed on real property, particularly a home, than on
personal property."); see also King, supra note 9, at 196 (discussing and critiquing this
doctrine). Certain foreign jurisdictions have also demonstrated concern for the sanctity of
the home when reviewing forfeiture actions. For example, the South African
Constitutional Court has concluded that "[f]or the purposes of forfeiture, it makes a
difference whether the property instrumental in crime is for example an uninhabited
factory building, or a home." Van der Burg and Another v National Director of Public
Prosecutions and Another, [2012] ZACC 12, para. 58 (S. Afr.). On a procedural level,
similar concern regarding the potential severe hardship imposed by forfeiture of the home
is manifested by the federal civil forfeiture statute's provision for the "immediate release
of seized property" during the pendency of a forfeiture proceeding if "the continued
possession by the Government pending the final disposition of forfeiture proceedings will
cause substantial hardship to the claimant, such as ... leaving an individual homeless." 18
U.S.C. § 983(f)(1)(C) (2006). The cases cited above might be said to provide an intriguing
example of judicial concern for tailoring penalties to "the subjective experience of
punishment." Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 182, 226 (2009) (making the case for offenders' subjective experience of punishment
as a relevant consideration, and noting that "there seems to be little retributive
justification for our general practice in the United States of imposing punitive fines that
are independent of offenders' experiences of those fines"). It is true that mandating such
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Clause-including the Magna Carta's protection of individuals'
homesteads and core personal possessionsm--can be read to support
such a doctrinal framework, as can the privileged place of the home in
other constitutional contexts.228 Likewise, it is noteworthy that some
an inquiry risks drawing courts into the difficult process of ascertaining idiosyncratic or
subjective value; this would particularly true if homes were protected not simply by a
categorical rule subjecting all home forfeitures to heightened scrutiny, but by a rule that
protected owner-occupied dwellings only insofar as the home in question had heightened
subjective value to the defendant and his or her family. See United States v. 564.54 Acres
of Land, More or Less, Situated in Monroe & Pike Counties, Pa., 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979)
(noting the "serious practical difficulties in assessing the worth an individual places on
particular property at a given time"); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto:
Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1233 n.67 (1991) (discussing the "difficulties
in accurately measuring idiosyncratic valuations" and in "ascertaining and fairly
compensating idiosyncratic and subjective valuations of property" and citing sources).
Nevertheless, the failure of (for example) the law of eminent domain to account for
surplus subjective value has been criticized by commentators, and one might well question
the notion that the measurement problems associated with determining subjective value
are truly insuperable. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking
Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 886 (2007) (noting that "many takings of
property are of nonfungible assets that hold value to the owner in excess of the property's
market value and of its nearest market substitutes" and suggesting reforms); see generally
Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 735-37, 745-46 (1973) (discussing the problem of
uncompensated subjective loses); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61, 82-85 (1986) (same).
227. In fact, parallels have occasionally been drawn between the livelihood-protection
provisions of the Magna Carta and state homestead laws. See, e.g., Frese v. State, 2 So. 1
(Fla. 1887); Louie W. Strum, Magna Carta, its History and Influence, 31 COM. L. LEAGUE
J. 513, 516 (1926); D.D. Wallace, The South Carolina Constitutional Convention of 1895, 4
SEWANEE R. 348, 358 (1896); but see Joseph W. McKnight, Mexican Roots of the
Homestead Law, in ESTUDIOS JURiDICOS EN HOMENAJE AL MAESTRO GUILLERMO
FLORIS MARGADANT 291, 292 (1988) (tracing the history of Texas's influential
Homestead Act of 1839 to the thirteenth-century Castilian legal code of the Siete
Partidas).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating
that "[t]he home occupies a special place in the pantheon of constitutional rights");
AMAR, supra note 97, at 62, 267 (noting that both "the Third and Fourth Amendments ...
explicitly protect 'houses'-above and beyond all other buildings-from needless and
dangerous intrusions by government officials" and that "the Third Amendment .. . bridges
together a home-centric Second Amendment and a Fourth Amendment that was from the
beginning protective of the private domain"); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
601 (1980) (noting "the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been
embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic") (footnote omitted); Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (emphasizing the privacy of the home in the context
of First Amendment obscenity doctrine); Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
(linking Second Amendment protections to the defense of the home); cf United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53-54 (1993) (noting, in the context of an
application of the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), that the
"right to maintain control over [the] home, and to be free from governmental interference,
is a private interest of historic and continuing importance"); Thomas G. Sprankling, Note,
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courts have focused in particular on the impact that the forfeiture of
an offender's home can have on that individual's children.229 In
addition to reflecting both the historical concerns underlying the
Excessive Fines Clause and fundamental values militating against the
punishment of innocents, a constitutional forfeiture jurisprudence
that would disfavor (all else being equal) those forfeitures that
impose particularly severe harms on an offender's children might find
support by reading the Excessive Fines Clause in conjunction with the
Corruption of Blood and Forfeiture Clauses of Article 111.230
Does Five Equal Three? Reading the Takings Clause in Light of the Third Amendment's
Protection of Houses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112 (2012) (proposing reading the Takings
Clause in conjunction with the Third Amendment in order to justify heightened scrutiny
of the seizure of homes); see generally AMAR, supra note 172, at 124-32 (suggesting that
the Supreme Court has "developed a case law of both enumerated rights and
unenumerated rights that recognizes the special significance of houses and what happens
inside them"); D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
255, 255 (2006) (cataloging the ways in which homes "are treated more favorably by the
law than other types of property"); John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 786 (2006) (same); Radin, supra note 137, at 986
(conceptualizing property rights as existing along a spectrum ranging from "personal" to
"fungible," locating the home at the "personal" end of this continuum, and suggesting that
"fungible property rights" might "be overridden in some cases in which... personal
property rights . .. cannot be").
229. See, e.g., United States v. 45 Claremont St., 395 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004); United
States v. Bieri, 68 F.3d 232, 237 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27
F.3d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Robinson, 721 F. Supp. 1541, 1544 (D.R.I.
1989); accord U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d)(3) (including as a relevant sentencing factor "the
burden that the fine places on the defendant and his dependents") (emphasis added).
230. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption
of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted."); see also Max
Stier, Note, Corruption of Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of the Parents Should
Not Matter, 44 STAN. L. REV. 727, 728 (1992) (presenting "the Corruption of Blood Clause
and the Bill of Attainder Clause" as "two provisions that establish the Framers' hostility to
harming children for parental conduct"); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L, REV. 26, 61 (2000) (discussing the potential broader
applicability of the "nonattainder principle" in the context of race); but see United States
v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038-39 (4th Cir. 1980) (concluding that although Article III's
substantive limitations on punishment for treason should be read to apply to other felonies
in light of "the irrationality of a ruling that forfeiture of estate cannot be imposed for
treason but can be imposed for... lesser crimes," only the "total disinheritance of one's
heirs .. .and forfeiture of all of one's property" would contravene these provisions).
In light of the potential relevance of these norms, it is perhaps unfortunate Article II's
provisions relating to the doctrine of forfeiture of estate have been so absent from modem
forfeiture scholarship and jurisprudence. See Larson, supra note 8, at 865 ("The Treason
Clause is one of the great forgotten clauses of the Constitution, and many well-trained
lawyers might be surprised to learn that it even exists."); but see David Pimentel,
Forfeitures Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal Court, 13 NEV. L.J. 1, 22
(2012) (calling attention to the fact that a provision of the Patriot Act appears essentially
to resurrect the concept of forfeiture of estate and questioning the constitutionality of that
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An additional doctrinal implication of a return to the original
meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause is procedural in nature. Once
we understand the centrality of an offender's personal circumstances
to the "excessiveness" calculus, certain types of mandatory schemes
of fines and forfeitures could become open to serious constitutional
question. Such systems risk the foreclosure of any individualized
inquiry into personal circumstances, tying punishment instead solely
to offense, rather than to offender."'
provision) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G)(i) (2006)); see also Stefan D. Cassella,
Forfeiture of Terrorist Assets Under the USA Patriot Act of 2001, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 7, 7-8 (2002) (noting that, in light of section 806 of the Patriot Act, "once the
Government establishes that a person, entity, or organization is engaged in terrorism
against the United States,... the Government can seize and ultimately mandate forfeiture
of all assets, foreign or domestic, of the terrorist entity, whether those assets are connected
to terrorism or not").
As an aside, I note that the provisions of Article III relating to the punishment of treason
have been subject to conflicting nomenclature. Compare United States v. Kim, 808 F.
Supp. 2d 44, 48-49 (DD.C. 2011) (referring to the entirety of Article III Section 3 as the
"Treason Clause") and Larson, supra note 8, at 865 (same), with United States v. Martino,
681 F.2d 952, 964 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) (Politz, J., dissenting) (referring to the "forfeiture
clause"); Brief for Respondent at 36 n.19, Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993)
(No. 91-1526), 1992 WL 511952 (U.S.) (same) and David P. Currie, The Civil War
Congress, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1131, 1194 (2006) (same) and Amar, supra, at 134 (referring
to the "Corruption of Blood Clause" as a distinct unit). I have adopted the latter
approach-disaggregating corruption of blood and forfeiture-both because the
Corruption of Blood Clause and the Forfeiture Clause are distinct grammatical clauses
and because the two prohibited punishments are, strictly speaking, distinct.
231. Cf Com. v. Carela-Tolentino, 48 A.3d 1221, 1222-29 (Pa. 2012) (Castille, C.J.,
dissenting) (suggesting a "one-size-fits-all mandatory approach" to criminal financial
penalties "violates constitutional prohibitions against excessive fines," in contrast to the
"more nuanced approach" set out by the Supreme Court in Bajakajian).
It is true that in the context of noncapital, non-juvenile Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause jurisprudence, courts have generally been unreceptive to attacks on mandatory
sentencing. See Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining
Nearly A Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1084 (2001)
("Relying on Harmelin, the circuit courts have uniformly rejected Eighth Amendment
challenges to long federal drug sentences.") (footnote omitted); Nathan Greenblatt, How
Mandatory Are Mandatory Minimums? How Judges Can Avoid Imposing Mandatory
Minimum Sentences, 36 AM. J. CRIM, L. 1, 8 (2008) ("Invalidating a [mandatory minimum]
statute based on the Eighth Amendment... will likely be reversed on appeal."); see
generally Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding sentence of mandatory
life without parole for drug possession); but cf Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing
Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CALIF. L.
REV. 61, 119 (1993) ("A central component of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence in capital cases is the defendant's right to an individualized determination of
the appropriateness of the death penalty.") (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
113-14 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 302-03 (1976) (plurality opinion)); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460
(2012) (concluding that mandatory life sentences for juveniles "runs afoul of our cases'
requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties"
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VII. Conclusion: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Eighth Amendment
The Magna Carta's specific protections of offenders'
"contenements" and "wainage" were developed in the context of the
feudal political economy of the high middle ages; this language was
archaic even by the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the basic
principles for which those provisions came to stand-that a fair and
just monetary penalty requires not just some form of proportionality
between penalty and offense, but also the protection of a minimum
core level of economic viability for persons against whom penalties
are assessed, determined with some reference to the individual's
personal economic circumstances-were unquestionably recognized
as fundamental rights at common law by the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. These principles, which are closely tied to
historical understandings of the meaning of the phrase "excessive
fines," remain highly relevant today. This Article has thus sought to
sketch one aspect of a constitutional vision that is faithful to text and
history and yet also profoundly concerned with the economic needs of
the most vulnerable members of society. Such issues of economic
survival and livelihood protection are core aspects of our
constitutional heritage, although they are often overlooked today.232
and "therefore hold[ing] that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18
at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and
unusual punishments'). However, it is important to recognize that the question whether
mandatory monetary penalties offend the autonomous Excessive Fines Clause is entirely
distinct from the question whether mandatory prison sentences violate the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.
232. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Social and Economic Rights in the American Grain:
Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (Jack Balkin
& Reva Siegel eds., 2009) ("Work and livelihoods; poverty and dependency; economic
security and insecurity: For most of our history their constitutional importance was self-
evident. The framers of 1789 had no doubt that personal liberty and political equality
demanded a measure of economic independence and material security."); William E.
Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999); Frank I.
Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L.
REv. 1319 (1987). 1 emphasize that throughout this piece my discussion has remained
firmly anchored within the sphere what Michelman termed "possessive," rather than
"distributive," rights-that is, "negative claims against interference with holdings, not
positive claims to endowments or shares." Id. at 1319. My account is thus consistent with
the traditional conceptualization of the Constitution as "a charter of negative rather than
positive liberties." Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner,
J.). Cf DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)
(noting that "our cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no
affirmative right to governmental aid"); see also Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:
A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990) (discussing and critiquing the "conventional
wisdom" on this point). However, it is noteworthy that the constitutional "economic
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survival" norm I identify-while grounded in the possessive (i.e., negative-rights)
tradition-is nevertheless not fundamentally antiredistributive. In eschewing a focus on
positive rights, my discussion stands in contradistinction to a number of other explorations
of what Charles Black famously called the "constitutional justice of livelihood." Charles
L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1103, 1103 (1986). For canonical articulations of variants of this thesis, see Amar,
supra note 192; Black, supra; Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); and Frank I. Michelman,
Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659.
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